PRIVATE SECTOR PEACEBUILDING:
A REVIEW OF PAST CASES AND LESSONS LEARNED
PRIVATE SECTOR PEACEBUILDING: A Review of Past Cases and Lessons Learned

Conor Seyle
Jinghong Wang

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Cover photo: Co-Chairmen of The India Pakistan CEO's Business Forum Hari S. Bhartia (L) and Amin Hashwani (R) shake hands after the signing of a Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU), during the inauguration of ‘India-Pakistan CEO’s Business Forum’ organised by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), in New Delhi, 14 September 2003. Photo: PRAKASH SINGH/AFP via Getty Images
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DISCLAIMER The inclusion of company names and/or examples in this publication is intended strictly for learning purposes and does not constitute an endorsement of the individual companies.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides an introduction to the existing research covering where, why, and how private sector actors (including individual business leaders, small firms, transnational corporations, and private associations) can contribute to peace. It is intended to complement the Peacebuilding Fund’s (PBF) guidance note on the private sector and peacebuilding by presenting a set of concrete cases in which private sector actors engaged in peacebuilding activity. In complement with that guidance note, UN actors interested in promoting private sector engagement can use this report to identify pathways to private sector partnerships in peace and cases that may provide specific examples of how this has been done in the past.

This report presents twelve cases of peacebuilding activity by the private sector, deliberately chosen to represent a diversity of actors, historical moments, and strategies. Not all of these interventions were successful, but collectively they provide a foundation of cases demonstrating where, why, and how private sector actors have attempted to contribute to peace. The twelve selected cases include the following:

- Nepal, 2006–present: The Nepali National Business Initiative, a coalition of business associations and companies, developed a collective strategy for both conflict-sensitive approaches to business practice and external communications supporting peace.

- Colombia, 1999–2002: Business leader Luis Carlos Villegas, the president of the National Association of Industries, participated in two rounds of peace negotiations between the government and Colombia’s largest guerrilla rebel group, in an effort to bring to an end the Colombian armed conflict.

- Nigeria, 1969: Vice president of Nestlé Alimentana Enrico Bignami acted in the role of special representative of the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to conduct negotiations between the Nigerian government and the ICRC around humanitarian aid delivery during the Biafran conflict.

- Israel and Palestine, 2002–present: PeaceWorks, a US specialty food distribution company with a “not-only-for-profit” philosophy, initiated profitable joint ventures between Palestinian and Israeli businesses in a bid to increase economic cooperation and promote intergroup contact.

- Colombia, 2011–2015: The Colombian Coffee Growers’ Federation developed and executed a multidimensional training and economic development program focused on supporting peace in partnership with international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation.

- Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2011–present: The Virunga Alliance is a conservation-focused peacebuilding public-private partnership. The Alliance emphasizes sustainable development of natural resources of the Virunga National Park, mostly through clean energy, ecotourism, and sustainable agriculture with the goal of promoting economic peacebuilding in eastern DR Congo.

- Cyprus, 2002–2013: The Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry initiated a series of coordinated work on cross-Cyprus unification issues, which facilitated the official peacebuilding process through economic integration and humanized contacts between the two sides.

- Northern Ireland, 1996–1998: A coalition of industry associations and other groups representing business and economic interests in Northern Ireland, the “Group of Seven,” engaged in a sustained push for peace through public messaging and private diplomacy based on the economic benefit peace would deliver.

- India, 2001–2002: At a period of extremely high tensions between India and Pakistan, concerns about a loss of international corporate investment led the Confederation of Indian Industry to lobby the Indian government to avoid conflict.
2   
Private Sector Peacebuilding: A Review of Past Cases and Lessons Learned

• United States, 1996–2008: A coalition of business leaders, eventually expanded to political actors and others, advocated for a reduction in US military spending through public advertising campaigns.

• The Netherlands, 1941–1943: Frits Philips, head of the Philips Company, deliberately hired Jewish workers and attempted to protect them from the Holocaust by using his work with the Nazi government to keep them from deportation.

• India/Pakistan, 2013: Coca-Cola set up linked video machines in India and Pakistan that encouraged individual citizens from each country to engage in joint games or activities designed to promote interpersonal connection and intergroup contact with the goal of reducing prejudice.

Across these twelve cases, general themes and lessons learned can be identified. These include the following:

• Private sector engagement in peacebuilding includes a spectrum of activities. Consistent with the recommendations of the PBF guidance note, peacebuilding that engages the private sector can include a broad range of activities, such as inclusive economic development for peace and industry self-regulation to address root-cause issues. More than that, they can include direct diplomacy or messaging support for peace, technical support to peacebuilding work, and other points of engagement. Peacebuilding actors should consider a broad range of potential engagement with private sector actors.

• Business association engagement is correlated with more consolidated peace. Because sustainable peace requires systemic change, sustained peace in these cases is more often associated with institutions able to operate at scale. Business associations or industry groups appear to be more effective partners for sustainable peace than individual firms, and peacebuilding actors should consider issues of scale and capacity when identifying institutions to target for outreach.

• Individuals matter. Many of the cases involving successful work are characterized by active engagement by specific individuals passionate about work for peace. Past research suggests the inverse is true, and that when individual business leaders don’t see a legitimate role
for private sector participation in peacebuilding then it is harder to motivate positive work. Together, this suggests that actors interested in supporting peacebuilding should consider weighting partnerships that involve passionate and active individuals more heavily than those requiring more active work to identify partners.

- **Successful interventions require multiple actors.** Consistent with the emerging understanding of what sustained peace requires, the cases with the most positive outcomes are characterized by the fact that the private sector is one partner in a coordinated collective push for peace. Peacebuilding actors interested in working with private sector partners should work to embed their strategies and specific projects in a larger mechanism for coordinated peacebuilding, and should consider bringing their private sector partners more formally into that system.

- **Innovation has not replaced tried-and-true methods.** The more successful cases in this set are also the activities most closely aligned with existing understanding of sustainable peace. Cases in our set characterized by coordinated diplomacy, public messaging for peace, and sustained inclusive development are associated with more effective outcomes than unilateral or one-off activities. While innovations in approaches can be valuable, these cases suggest that systemic, coordinated work is the most effective approach.

- **There are multiple motivations for intervention, but economic interests persist across cases.** It is not true that the actors in these cases are motivated solely and only by profit, and there are many examples here of businesses or individuals taking principled stands for humanitarian purposes. At the same time, the most consistent element visible in why firms and associations say they are interested in peace is economic. Understanding the specific motivations of potential private sector partners is a necessary first step to designing and delivering effective partnerships.
I. INTRODUCTION

Effective peacebuilding requires addressing multiple issues driving conflict, which in turn requires a complex and systemic response. Achieving this response is an extraordinary task in any area where conflict is ongoing or where conflict is a risk, and the secretary-general has acknowledged that the best way to achieve systemic peace is through the coordinated effort of “the United Nations, national Governments and other key stakeholders, including international, regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions, civil society organizations, women’s groups, youth organizations and the private sector.”

The United Nations has a long history of work with both state and non-state actors in the peacebuilding field, and relatively well-developed models for working with many of these sectors. Where this is perhaps less true is the case of the private sector. While private sector actors have supported the work of the UN specifically and work on peace and security more broadly, it’s also the case that they remain a side focus of the traditional peacebuilding apparatus. This is despite the fact that in many different conflicts of the 20th and 21st centuries, there are examples of individual business leaders, national firms, transnational companies, and business associations actively contributing to peacebuilding and stability either through their own work or in partnership with national or international actors. These cases, while well-documented in the business and peace literature, are relatively less widely known in the peacebuilding and stability community. As a result, organizations working on complex peacebuilding may be less familiar with what private sector actors can do for peace, why they may choose to do it, and how they can work with other peacebuilders.

This report is intended to address these gaps. It was originally developed through discussions between representatives of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), the UN Global Compact, One Earth Future, and PeaceNexus about challenges in engaging the private sector in peacebuilding activities. This discussion suggested that one barrier to effective work was a lack of awareness of concrete models for private sector partnerships in peacebuilding. While the theory of business engagement in peace was relatively well-acknowledged within the UN institutions engaged in peacebuilding, there was a demand for better documentation of specific cases where the private sector has been a positive partner for peace.

To address this concern, this report provides a set of case studies describing where private sector entities took conscious and deliberate steps to contribute to peace. While the official scope of the private sector within the UN includes all non-state actors, in this report we use the generic term “private sector actors” to refer to profit-oriented businesses and their associations and professional organizations. Importantly, this includes a broad range of potential partners ranging from small local firms to transnational corporations and national or international business associations. In this report we have attempted to identify cases that illustrate the diversity of potential actors as well as their potential impacts.

While not all of the actors in the cases reported here were successful in their goals, these cases all represent deliberate and public efforts to contribute to peace. Based on these cases, this report also provides some general guidelines or lessons learned about what may distinguish the more effective cases from those that are less so. These lessons are intended to be applicable to entities interested in peacebuilding, including entities that are already connected to some local private sector actors and want guidance on what private sector actors can do to contribute to peace, and also entities who have not yet identified specific partners. This is intended to be a partner document to the forthcoming Peacebuilding Fund guidance note on the private sector and peacebuilding, which lays out specific guidance for how projects proposed for funding through the PBF can develop methods for approaching and working with the private sector.

Structurally, this report has the following elements. To begin, we present a review of existing research on peacebuilding and stability work and how the private sector has been involved in the past. Following this, we present an overview of 12 cases selected to illustrate different types of private actors and their role in different conflict contexts and in different
historical moments. After this, we discuss the key lessons learned from this set of cases and identify recommendations for engaging private sector actors in issues of peacebuilding. The full case studies for each of the 12 cases are presented in Appendix I.

II. SUSTAINING PEACE: COMPLEX PEACEBUILDING AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Delivering sustainable, resilient peace in either prevention or post-conflict settings means simultaneously achieving a number of different complex and interconnected end goals. Sustainable peace requires an active economy delivering opportunities to the population, political systems strong enough and engaged enough to be seen as legitimate and effective at distributing public goods, and security institutions that can prevent spoilers and criminal actors from disrupting the peace. Sustainable peace requires systems and institutions that provide ways for all genders and ethnic or identity groups in a country to feel included and represented in the decisions of the country.

Delivering this is a significant challenge in any country, and in particular a massive challenge in areas of active conflict where the conflict itself and the demands of rebuilding force competing priorities on actors interested in supporting peace. The UN has acknowledged this challenge and is actively working on addressing this through the Sustaining Peace agenda, as well as ongoing learning and reforms of peacekeeping operations. UN peacekeeping operations have evolved with the broadening understanding of both security and what is needed for sustainable peace, from early attempts...
to develop coordinated strategies through the 2000 Brahimi Report’s call for integrated mission approaches and the evolving methods for implementing these models.

The majority of this work has emphasized improving coordination and coherence among the various UN actors working in peacebuilding and peacekeeping. However, the challenges of sustainable peace are significant, and several recent activities at the UN have demonstrated that complex challenges, especially those of peacebuilding and sustaining peace, require working with new partnerships outside of the UN. One place where this is visible is in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The 2030 Agenda is a massive endeavor spanning almost every aspect of human development and human security. Even partial implementation would deliver another significant step forward in human security, continuing the improvements associated with the Millennium Development Goals. At the same time, the complexity and scope of the 2030 Agenda mean that delivering its promise is an extraordinary challenge. In the development of the 2030 Agenda, the UN General Assembly recognized the scope of this challenge, and the final Sustainable Development Goal, SDG 17, acknowledged that achieving the 2030 Agenda would require new partnerships. SDG 17 formally calls for states to “Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development,” which then decomposes to a number of subsidiary targets. The specific targets for SDG 17 include improving financing for development, capacity, technology, trade, and systemic issues. Among the issues identified is the need for new multi-stakeholder partnerships. Targets 17.16 and 17.17 call for developing new public-private partnerships and multi-stakeholder systems for delivering the 2030 Agenda.

In the peacekeeping and peacebuilding space specifically, there are similar moves in formal UN documents. Secretary-General Guterres’s 2019 report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace places the challenges of coherency, prevention, and complementarity at the center of the UN’s work across the peace and security pillar. In this report, Secretary-General Guterres lays out a vision for the UN’s work that ensures development activities, peacekeeping activities, and systemic peacebuilding are planned in a unified way and sufficiently resourced in order to ensure a comprehensive and sustainable path is laid out. He places the issue of “partnerships for peacebuilding and sustaining peace” as one of the core necessities to deliver sustained peace. This includes outreach and engagement with other international governmental organizations, including international financial institutions, with women’s organizations and youth organizations, and a call for more extensive outreach with civil society and the private sector.

The joint World Bank/UN report “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict” reviewed the existing research and practice on complex peacebuilding. This report discussed the complexity of conflict and the need for complex and multi-institutional engagement for peace. One conclusion of the report was that “The more successful cases mobilized a coalition of domestic actors to influence incentives toward peace, bringing in the comparative advantages of civil society, including women’s groups, the faith community, and the private sector to manage tensions.” Based on these cases, a central recommendation is that prevention could be improved by “a focus on strengthening the capacity of the society, not just the state, for prevention. . . . Coalitions should reflect the importance of young people, women, the private sector, and civil society organizations.”

Collectively, this work reflects a growing consensus in both academic research and policy analysis: sustained peace requires complex and sustained engagement from peacebuilding actors, operating across multiple issue spaces and bringing in multiple sectors of society to deliver this. The international system has a relatively strong history of operationalizing this partnership in the case of civil society. To take only one example, the International Committee of the Red Cross has coordinated closely with governments and international institutions to deliver humanitarian aid in conflict settings since the 19th century. However, cases of private sector engagement are not as well-documented, and an emerging question...
for international organizations is how to unlock the benefit of the private sector. What specifically can private actors be expected to contribute, and why and how can they do so?

**Roles for the Private Sector**

Against this backdrop, it’s clear that not only are there multiple roles for the private sector in supporting peacebuilding, but an approach to sustainable peace that doesn’t include some role for non-state actors, including the private sector, is limited. Existing research and practice on the role of businesses in peace have charted out a number of potential points of entry, ranging from do-no-harm approaches, to conflict-sensitive business practices that can affect firms’ contributions to underlying issues driving conflict, to active and specific activities that businesses, individual business leaders, and coalitions of businesses have executed in order to contribute to peace.

The baseline role for private sector actors is simply to avoid active contribution to the conflict. This is not necessarily a trivial request: while violence is exceptionally destructive and can harm the overall economy significantly, a global trend is not necessarily true for all firms. It is certainly the case that some firms profit from conflict in ways that reinforce the negative conflict dynamics. In the modern conflict environment, often involving violent non-state actors, issues of wartime economies are central to many conflict dynamics. There are a number of ways that private sector actors with operations that touch conflict areas directly or indirectly can profit from engaging in the violence, knowingly or unknowingly. Companies that are careless about inspecting their supply chains that run through conflict areas, or who are forced to interact with armed actors requesting “taxes” for their operations, can actively drive conflict dynamics. More directly, media companies, military equipment companies, and others can profit from the engagement and new customers that conflict brings. At the most basic level, companies interested in contributing to peacebuilding can audit their engagement in conflict areas and avoid profiting from the violence.

More active engagement, while still limiting contributions to firms’ own internal operations, is an attempt to reduce drivers of violence or to promote the protection of civilians. Companies can structure their operations to address or reduce the sensitivity of major issues of contention. For example, in areas where there are deep-seated identity-based grievances or concerns, companies can develop hiring practices that ensure they are hiring in a balanced way. Companies can consider how they may respond to an outbreak of violence or instability and develop plans to mitigate the impact on their employees. Firms can promote transparency in contracting and supply-chain management to reduce the ability of violent actors to divert funds. Executing any of these approaches requires companies to consciously analyze the conflict drivers in the areas where they operate and engage systematically in methods designed to avoid increasing the risk.

Finally, firms may choose to actively go beyond their specific activities and engage directly in peacemaking or peacebuilding. In this role, their contributions could include lobbying political leaders for peace, providing technical or financial resources to peacebuilding actors, or acting as a mediator, shuttle diplomat, or convener of discussions to address the conflict. Private sector actors can be effective adjuncts to these peacebuilding approaches because their perceived neutrality as being “only interested in profit” can help conflict actors accept them as disinterested in a specific political outcome.

**Motivations for Private Sector Engagement**

Understanding how to engage the private sector requires understanding why firms or individual businesses may be involved. A 2007 study of private sector engagement in the 2006 Lebanon-Israeli war surveyed seven local managers of major transnational companies operating in the conflict region to explore what they did in the conflict and why. These
interviews suggested that these managers universally recognized the potential negative impact of the conflict on their business and its overall negative impact on Lebanon. The managers also felt a responsibility to the country, and for this reason as well as economic reasons didn’t want to shut down operations in country. Despite these pressures, none of the firms chose to directly engage in any activity designed to generate peace. In exploring why that was, the authors found that these business leaders were interested in the idea of corporate peacebuilding but did not think that they would be seen as legitimate partners in peacebuilding by the government or that such a role was necessarily in their power to deliver. In that case, a lack of appreciation of both the interest and motivations of private sector actors may have hampered effective collaborative work: some outreach by governments to reassure private sector actors that there was a legitimate role for participation and to identify pathways to participation may have opened the door to effective work.

This kind of outreach must necessarily be seated in both a concrete understanding of what companies can do and also an understanding of “how to make the ask”—how to identify areas of mutual interest in order to build a foundation for collaborative work. Despite the popular conception of the private sector as limited to a specific focus on profit, the private sector is composed of people and it’s quite often the case that these people choose to act from moral or humanitarian concern as much as thoughts of profit. With that said, the profit motive is an existential driver for firms: if they fail to profit then they will fail as an organization. Because of this, economic considerations will certainly affect firms’ willingness to participate in peacebuilding. It’s important to note, though, that as discussed above the global truth that armed conflict impacts the economy may or may not hold true at the individual firm level. Engagement with private sector actors about their contribution to peace must operate with an understanding of their specific motivations, constraints, and connections to the local economy.

Current UN Engagement With the Private Sector on Issues of Peacebuilding

Consistent with the secretary-general’s call for more engaged multi-stakeholder work, as well as the general trend toward more cross-sectoral engagement, the UN has been developing successful partnerships with private sector actors for peacebuilding. One pathway for this work has come through the Peacebuilding Fund, which includes an emphasis on private sector partnerships through its third priority area, focusing on revitalizing local economies. Through this work, the primary emphasis has been on supporting sustainable economic activities that rebuild economies in conflict-affected countries. Some examples of positive work through this pathway include the following.

A PBF-funded program in Colombia in 2018 called for applications from UN agencies, the private sector, and NGOs to identify projects focused on improving funding in areas affected by conflict with the goal of supporting peacebuilding through blended financing. The applications received were entirely from the private sector and civil society organizations, with no UN agency submitting an application. A number of applications were recommended for funding, however, with the result that as of the writing of this report, 12 projects were selected to submit full proposals to the PBF. In the current project landscape, funding from the PBF is being used to unlock significant private sector and other funding, working out to an average leveraging of private sector funding of 4.4 times the initial funding.

The PBSO’s work on peacebuilding has led to several concrete cases of public-private partnerships for peace. In Liberia, company-community tensions had led to open violence in several regions due to local concerns that land rights were not recognized, that women were not consulted appropriately in negotiations, and that there were perceived underpayments for crops. The United Nations Development Programme, working with the Food and Agriculture Organization, the National Bureau of Concessions, the Central Agricultural Research Institute, and EDUCARE and funded by the Peacebuilding Fund as well as local private sector actors, addressed local concerns through the establishment of dialogue programs and livelihood training that connected to local markets. In the cross-border region between Sudan and South Sudan, one driver of violence was cross-border conflict between nomadic pastoralists. Following a collective discussion hosted by the nonprofit organization Concordis, a joint market emphasizing collective economic development was launched.
This private sector activity emphasized cross-community communication and spun off a number of dispute resolution committees that successfully worked to resolve issues before violence developed.

The UN Global Compact has approached public-private partnerships for peace from another direction. While the PBSO and the peace pillar of the UN focus first on peace and have come to private sector engagement from that standpoint, the Global Compact is the primary UN entity focused on engagement with the private sector and has developed work focused on how this mission relates to the UN’s peace pillar. As a part of its work, the Global Compact has developed the Business for Peace platform connecting private sector actors with others interested in promoting partnerships for peace. The work of the “B4P” platform includes a commitment from member firms to adhere to the Global Compact’s 10 Principles on human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption as well as to contribute to peace either through independent work of the firms or through supporting the capacity of Global Compact local networks. These local networks emphasize locally nuanced and bottom-up engagement on issues driving conflict in local societies.

**Current Research**

The current research was designed to address a gap in the discussion around business and peacebuilding, particularly in the UN context. While the general theory has been well-developed and there are cases that may be familiar to peacebuilding actors in the UN, peacebuilders may struggle to find a diversity of specific, concrete cases of private sector engagement in peacebuilding. This research was designed to develop plain-language case studies of where, how, and (to the extent possible) why private sector actors have contributed to peace in the past.

In doing this, we join a body of literature that has been developing in research and theory since at least a seminal 2000 report by Jane Nelson on “the business of peace.” While cases of private sector engagement in peace can be found in almost every major war of the 20th century, Nelson set out a formal framework to examine where, why, and how firms have contributed to peace and security, and accelerated the developing discussion. Since that report, research in this field has tended to either identify broad trends or illustrate a small set of specific cases. Relatively detailed case studies, presented in a structure that allows comparison across multiple cases, are rare but by no means nonexistent. This creates an opportunity for the current research: there are enough pieces in the existing literature to identify cases where the private sector has participated in peace, and often enough primary literature (as well as secondary) to allow for comparison across cases.

In our review of the literature, we identified a few comparable projects. A 2006 report by International Alert titled *Local Business, Local Peace* is most comparable, as it includes 18 detailed cases where local businesses have contributed to peacebuilding. These cases are available both as a part of the report and as individual cases on the International Alert website. Although geared primarily toward questions of extractive industries, the 2015 book *Peacemaking and the Extractive Industries: Towards a Framework for Corporate Peace* by Natalie Ralph includes a number of cases, organized by type of firm or association, and written in a comparative fashion that allows for generalized conclusions to be drawn. Oliver Westerwinter, a professor at the University of St. Galen, has a nearly completed data set focusing on public-private partnerships for governance of different areas, including security. Molly Melin of Loyola University is in the process of collecting “In the Company of Peace and Conflict (COPC)” data, which include information on corporate activities that have implications for the stability of the societies in which they operate, coded from 2000 to 2017 according to the UN Global Compact Indicators of economic, social, and environmental contributions. In addition to these sources, numerous books, articles, and reports have included information about specific cases or generalized trends on issues of peace and security.
To execute the case studies, we first created a list of potential cases by reviewing major published literature on business and peace. Any case mentioned in the literature that fit our declared scope was flagged for inclusion. After this, a second pass was conducted of the cases either identifying a second source for the same claim or confirming that the case had well-described primary sources cited in the original literature. The resulting list included 39 cases for potential inclusion. From this list, we selected 12 cases in an attempt to balance geographic and decade representation, different types of actors, and different types of strategy. The 12 cases are loosely categorized as 3 cases involving private sector actors engaging in mediation or negotiation; 3 cases where the primary work was internal to the private sector and focused on improving coordination, development, or peacebuilding; 3 cases that heavily featured public lobbying or activism by private sector actors; and 3 “eclectic” cases where companies engaged in unusual messaging campaigns or other activities aimed at peace. Most of the cases involved actors executing more than one activity, so this categorization was not strict. We also attempted to demonstrate the role of individual business leaders, firms, and collective associations in the different cases. See Table 1 for a full list of cases.

TABLE 1: CASES SELECTED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>WHEN</th>
<th>BUSINESS ACTORS</th>
<th>ACTOR TYPE</th>
<th>PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITY</th>
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<td><strong>Cases Involving Negotiation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Involving Engagement Or Support</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1999–2002</td>
<td>Luis Carlos Villegas, president, National Association</td>
<td>Individual business leader</td>
<td>Direct engagement in negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cases Involving Economic Activity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2002–present</td>
<td>PeaceWorks</td>
<td>Individual firm</td>
<td>Peacebuilding through economic activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2011–2015</td>
<td>Colombian National Federation of Coffee Growers</td>
<td>Business association</td>
<td>Peacebuilding through economic activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>2011–</td>
<td>Virunga Alliance</td>
<td>Public-private partnership</td>
<td>Peacebuilding through economic activity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>present</td>
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<td><strong>Cases Involving Diplomacy Or Public Engagement In Peace Messaging</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>2009–</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and the Cyprus</td>
<td>Business associations</td>
<td>Economic integration and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>present</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce and Industry</td>
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After these cases were selected, we reviewed existing research including primary and secondary literature to find sufficient information to develop a coherent case study. This review of research raised a point of concern about the business and peace literature. The existing research is divided between relatively deep case studies, some emerging data sets, and analytical reviews of the general approach that can be taken by companies, peppered with less-developed examples or mentions of activities taken by businesses. In the latter case, our search for primary sources suggested that some cases presented as examples of private sector peacebuilding are less supported than the literature presents. For example, several reviews of the existing literature mentioned a case in which a construction company was involved directly in promoting peace in the Balkans, but all citations of this ultimately traced back to a mention by Nelson\(^25\) that they engaged in hiring practices designed to reduce conflict. While this may be true — the company was deeply engaged in the Balkans and in particular directly involved in the development of plans for post-conflict infrastructure development,\(^26\) — in our review of the literature we could find no evidence that they engaged in conflict-sensitive hiring with the goal of promoting peace. Similar examples of slight distortions or claims made without significant primary sources were found in several other cases as well, suggesting that there is a need for more rigorous documentation of the efforts of businesses in this space.
III. REVIEW OF CASES AND GENERAL LESSONS

These cases were deliberately selected to provide a survey of the different ways that different private sector groups have engaged in peacebuilding in the past, with a conscious emphasis on demonstrating different types of engagement by different actors at different points of history. They are not a random sample and can’t be treated as a representative sample of the scope of private sector peacebuilding. They are also not comprehensive in that they do not capture every kind of potential engagement or interaction with peacebuilding organizations. With that significant caveat, these cases do have some collective implications and repeated lessons that are valuable to discuss.

Private Sector Engagement In Peacebuilding Includes A Spectrum Of Activities.

Consistent with the existing research, the case studies here show a wide variety of engagement in peacebuilding. This includes protection of civilians, as in the Philips case; through inclusive economic development that emphasizes intergroup contact or improved local economies, as in the PeaceWorks, Virunga Alliance, and Colombian National Federation of Coffee Growers cases; up to a sustained campaign of coordinated public messaging and private diplomacy as in the Nepali National Business Initiative and Group of Seven cases. There is no one specific role for businesses identified in these cases, and indeed these cases illustrate the fact that there is a diversity of potential roles for the private sector.

The implication of this for UN actors and others interested in engaging private sector actors is that regardless of what a conflict analysis suggests is a root or contributing cause to conflict, there is at least the potential for some private entity to contribute to addressing it. The traditional focus within peacebuilding of looking at firms primarily as funders of peacebuilding work or as actors primarily in an economic context is somewhat limited: there are cases of contributions across a wide range of activities, and peacebuilders should look beyond a narrow focus on economic development approaches when considering the potential role of firms and associations.

Business Association Engagement Is Associated With More Consolidated Peace.

Some of the cases identified above are associated with peace processes or situations that resulted in more sustained peace, or at minimum frozen conflicts. The cases of Northern Ireland, Nepal, Cyprus, and the Balkans are all examples of conflicts that were characterized by active violence that did not reoccur following the peace processes that the actors described in these case studies participated in. These cases are significant because in each case the private sector actor that engaged in the work was a business association or other collective business organization. This pattern may suggest that business association engagement, rather than work with individual firms, may be a more significant pathway to consolidated peace than more targeted or individual work.

In each of the cases discussed, business associations were able to act in a multifaceted way to support peace. Frequently these cases involved private diplomacy promoting peace, as in Nepal and the Confederation of Indian Industry in 2001 where the business association lobbied for peace. These cases also frequently involved some public-facing engagement promoting the necessity of peace as a tool for economic development, as in Northern Ireland where the Group of Seven paired private diplomacy with a public argument about the harm that the conflict was doing to the local economy. In all of these cases, the associations were able to speak with a unified voice representing a large sector of the economies. Their position as specific representatives of the private sector also let them present their arguments as a neutral call for peace rather than a demand for a specific resolution to the conflict, which may have increased their impact. Similar activities carried out by individual firms may not have been as successful, as they may not have had the political organization or
engagement necessary and may have been hampered by others’ perception that they were operating for their own individual benefit rather than representing a collective interest.

The Nepal case and the 2011 Colombian case also featured business associations or groups using their ability to act at scale to generate large-scale change. The business and peace research as a whole suggests that there are pathways by which individual companies can contribute to peace, and the UN and NGO communities have developed strong guidance documents for how this can be done such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights or International Alert’s guidance on conflict-sensitive business practice. Individual cases suggest that such programs can reduce company-community conflict, or potentially reduce conflict at the local scale. However, the reality of scale and the scope of conflict mean that it is difficult for the work carried out by an individual firm to affect large-scale conflict dynamics. Operating at the level of business associations or collective groups can generate large-scale impact that may be more able to affect large conflict dynamics. The ability of the business association to speak with and for a large community of firms let these groups affect a larger geographic area than more limited work might have. Business and peace researcher Jason Miklian described it this way:

A business-peace project that works on community reconciliation in three villages is unlikely to make a true peace contribution, while one that works in 3,000 villages, as was done by the Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros in Colombia through their “Footprints of Peace” project, may indeed have significant long-term positive peace impacts.

It’s important to note that the causal link between business associations and peace may be more complicated than it appears at first blush. If the value of business association engagement comes in part from the demonstration that there is a unified and nonpoliticized community interest in peace as an outcome, then the existence of such a community is a necessary precondition for their ability to work. In some areas, the local private sector may be polarized or drawn into the conflict in ways that demonstrate the fact that there is no widespread call for peace. In areas where this is the case, business associations may be unable or unwilling to take an active role.

For peacebuilding organizations, the implication of this point is that where UN actors or international peacebuilders are looking to engage with private sector partners, the most effective starting point may be business associations in areas of conflict. In particular, this can include associations representing local firms directly exposed to the impact of violence (as in the case of the Colombian National Federation of Coffee Growers), associations representing the economic interests of the private sector as a whole (as with the Confederation of British Industry in Northern Ireland), or associations representing heavily internationalized sectors that may be exposed to pressure from investors interested in peace (as with the Confederation of Indian Industry).

**Where UN actors or international peacebuilders are looking to engage with private sector partners, the most effective starting point may be business associations in areas of conflict.**

**Individuals Matter.**

In many of the cases, individual decision-makers and business leaders made a clear impact. In some cases, such as Colombia in 1999 and Nigeria during the Biafran conflict, this took the form of someone with a background in the private sector who engaged in boundary-spanning work in a new capacity (in both of those cases, a businessperson took an active role in negotiations). In other cases, specifically in the Netherlands’ case from World War II, this took the form of a business leader who used the decision-making authority of his position to direct the resources of the company in ways that supported the protection of civilians—behavior that would later be echoed by other decision-makers such as Paul Rusesabagina in Rwanda and the staff of the Taj Mahal Palace during the Mumbai attacks. Even in cases involving larger
organizations or associations, there are several where a specific individual’s vision or decisions can be identified as key parts of the story, as in the cases of PeaceWorks and the Virunga Alliance.

This underscores the role of individuals as much as institutions in driving the performance and engagement of private sector actors in peacebuilding contexts. Individuals, whether motivated by a humanitarian impulse or ethical commitment (as in the Netherlands case) or mixing personal and professional motivations (as the Colombian case suggests), are an important part of understanding when specific companies choose to engage in peacebuilding. While structural reasons for engagement appear to often support firms’ behavior, the active role of individual decision-makers appears across multiple cases. Conversely, past research has shown that when individual decision-makers in firms are skeptical about the role of the private sector in peacebuilding, the result is likely to be anemic action or inaction.

The implication for the UN and international peacebuilding organizations is to assess partnerships on the basis of the individuals involved as much as the structure of the potential partnership. An active and engaged individual decision-maker in the private sector is likely to be an important part of the success of the program. While this is of course generically true for all partnerships, the relative novelty of private sector peacebuilding work suggests that as this is not yet a standard way of thinking or a standard approach for either private sector or international work, it may be more important to identify specific active and engaged individuals to drive the project forward in a context of uncertainty.

Successful Interventions Involve Multiple Actors.

Very few of the cases involve unitary action by single groups, and none of the cases associated with sustained peace do. In each of the cases, the actions of businesses are one part of a larger enterprise. Sometimes, these are actively
Private Sector Peacebuilding: A Review of Past Cases and Lessons Learned

coordinated as in the case of Nepal or Northern Ireland where the private sector actors participated in formal discussions or coordination mechanisms that allowed information-sharing between different actors. In other cases, such as the case of the Confederation of Indian Industry, the private sector actors emphasized or reinforced perspectives delivered to decision-makers along other pathways. This is consistent with the understanding of sustainable peace arrived at in the Sustaining Peace Agenda; the World Bank’s emerging approach to addressing fragility, conflict, and violence; and the aggregate empirical work on predictors of peace. Sustaining peace is complex and requires the establishment of a reinforcing system of good governance, economic development, and security provision. No single sector of society can easily deliver all of the conditions for peace, and public-private partnerships appear to work best when they are embedded in larger coordination networks delivering multisectoral peace interventions.

In practice the primary challenge for delivering such peace is often an issue of the pragmatics of coordination. Differing organizational cultures and priorities and lack of a unified chain of command can be major issues for delivering multidimensional peacebuilding even for single-sector efforts. These issues can be significantly compounded when considering partnerships with the private sector or other organizations outside of a unified sector. Within the UN context, the secretary-general’s recent reforms of the peace pillar of the UN’s work are intended in part to address this issue and improve coherency of peace work across the UN. Potential partnerships with the private sector need to be integrated into the coordination mechanisms of the UN entities involved in the peacebuilding work, or the risk of uncoordinated and unsustainable partnerships is increased.

The primary implication of this lesson for UN entities is the need to integrate private sector partnerships within the larger governance plans and systems in place for coordinated work. These may change depending on the specific country involved and the degree to which the UN has committed a specific mission or program to focus on peace within the target country. Whatever the primary means are for encouraging coordination, it may be valuable for the private sector partners themselves to be represented in meetings or other mechanisms for coordination, rather than treated primarily as the recipient of funding or engagement from UN institutions.

Innovation Has Not Replaced Tried-And-True Methods.

As discussed above, a number of publications in the existing research on business and peacebuilding have mapped a spectrum of behavior ranging from disengagement, to conflict-sensitive business practices, up to active and direct engagement in the politics of peacebuilding. The cases discussed here include a set of “eclectic” interventions falling outside of the kinds of proposals in the mainstream of the research discussion, including the case of Coke in India and the Business Leaders for New Priorities in the United States. This reflects the fact that companies are engaging in peacebuilding in novel and unexpected ways that are worth documenting. It’s also worth noting, however, that the impact of these interventions seems much less significant or lasting compared to projects where private sector partners acted in a collective response to conflict through development, coordination, and diplomacy. In the cases presented here, some interventions demonstrate novel approaches to engaging in peacebuilding and may establish new ways for supporting peace. However, across these initiatives the impact appears to be relatively limited, if present at all compared to programs following more traditional approaches to systemic engagement with development and security issues. These interventions suggest that there is no silver bullet for private sector engagement in peace, and more traditional forms of intervention may still be the most effective.

The practical implication of this lesson is a call to exercise a certain amount of skepticism in assessing the impact of proposed projects. Projects in these case studies associated with sustained peace are closely in line with the existing mainstream understanding of what peacebuilding needs: they represent lasting, sustained engagement with the
grievances at the heart of the conflict (as in the case of the Nepali National Business Initiative), coordinated public and private diplomacy promoting elite buy-in to peace (as in the case of the Group of Seven), and systemic issues of inclusive development (as in the Colombian National Federation of Coffee Growers). Idiosyncratic and one-off engagement by companies does not appear to deliver significant impact, and when such partnerships are proposed or considered, it’s worth exercising more significant skepticism and calling for a deeper examination of the theory of change and likelihood of success than in other cases.

There Are Multiple Motivations For Intervention, But Economic Interests Persist Across Cases.

Across the cases, there are diverse reasons for business actors to act to promote peace. Humanitarian impulses are visible in the PeaceWorks case, in the Netherlands case, and in others. Personal experiences of the conflict appear in both Colombian cases, one at the individual level and another at the collective level. It is a mistake to assume that businesses were solely interested in participating in peacebuilding activities because of a narrow calculation of their economic interests. Despite this truth, in almost every case economic interests were a primary element of the discussion and particularly present in public engagement around peace. These intersected with the economic aspects of the conflict as well: the economic well-being of the private sector and how they chose to structure their business activities were clearly evident in the PeaceWorks, Nepal, Colombian Coffee Growers’ Federation, and Virunga Alliance cases.

The practical implication of this for organizations interested in private sector partnerships for peace is that UN organizations must, in advance of a partnership, develop an internal understanding that the interest of potential partners may or may not be peace for its own sake, and shape their strategy and engagement accordingly. Engagement and strategic planning with private sector partners need to first develop a shared understanding about both the desired end goals and the motivations of actors, in order to effectively develop coordinated work. If a private actor is genuinely interested in peace as an end goal for humanitarian reasons, then the typical discourse around humanitarian work and the framing of joint work through this lens may contribute to effective partnerships. If, on the other hand, economic concerns predominate the strategy of the private sector, then a discourse and planning process centered on humanitarian or normative ends may lead to less effective or efficient planning due to misunderstanding. Entering partnerships with a clear understanding of why firms and businesses are interested in working toward peace is critical for developing jointly accepted project goals.

IV. OVERALL IMPLICATIONS FOR UN ENGAGEMENT IN PEACEBUILDING

Detailed recommendations for how to develop partnerships for peacebuilding are included in the forthcoming PBF Guidance Note on the Private Sector and Peacebuilding, and readers interested in pragmatic guidance on steps to take for outreach or engagement with the private sector are encouraged to refer to that note. With that caveat, a general set of recommendations drawn from the cases included here as well as previous research follows.

The emerging consensus of the peacebuilding community emphasizes the necessity for coordinated multidimensional interventions for sustainable peace. While these interventions have some generic conclusions—we know that inclusive development, legitimate governance, and gender and ethnic inclusive systems are universally important tools for
peace—in each specific conflict context they must be rooted in an understanding of local conflict dynamics. Against this background, the cases presented in this report and the existing research on peacebuilding call for a broad consideration of the role of the private sector in peacebuilding. Because private sector actors are embedded in societies at multiple levels, they have the potential to contribute to many aspects of peacebuilding (while being central to issues of development and inclusive economic growth).

Engaging the private sector must start with a mapping of conflict dynamics in a target country paired with a mapping of the existing actors in the space, including the private sector. From that mapping, points of entry and engagement between the private sector and conflict analysis can be identified. The PBF guidance note proposes five specific points of entry to consider: the private sector as a source or target for violence, as a provider of sustainable peace-supporting livelihoods, as a source of technical or practical support for peacebuilding, as a source for financial resources for peacebuilding, and as a political actor directly promoting peace through political engagement. Against these five points of entry, projects with specific theories of change and associated strategic plans can be developed.

In developing these plans and points of engagement, it is useful to keep in mind the key considerations of the case studies above. Questions of how to work at scale, which private sector actors and which key leaders are engaged and capable of delivering sustained engagement, and what their motivations are will all be central to developing partnerships for sustained peace. Nonetheless, as the case studies presented here demonstrate, the private sector can be an active and committed partner for peace.
V. APPENDIX: CASES

CASES INVOLVING NEGOTIATION ENGAGEMENT OR SUPPORT

Colombia, 1999–2002, Luis Carlos Villegas, president, National Association of Industries

CASES INVOLVING ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Israel, 2002–present, PeaceWorks
Colombia, 2011–2015, Colombian National Federation of Coffee Growers
Cyprus, 2009–2013, Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO) and the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI)

CASES INVOLVING DIPLOMACY OR PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT IN PEACE MESSAGING

Northern Ireland, 1996, Group of 7
Democratic Republic of Congo, 2011–present, Virunga Alliance
India/Pakistan, 2001, Confederation of Indian Industry

CASES INVOLVING ECLECTIC INTERVENTIONS IN PEACE

USA, 1996, Business Leaders for New Priorities
The Netherlands, 1943, Philips
India/Pakistan, 2013, Coca-Cola
NATIONAL BUSINESS INITIATIVE, NEPAL, 2006–2019

One-Sentence Summary

The Nepali National Business Initiative, a coalition of business associations and companies, developed a collective strategy for both conflict-sensitive approaches to business practice and external communications supporting peace in Nepal.

Conflict Context

Nepal is currently a federal democratic republic, but historically in the 20th century it was governed by a constitutional monarchy that took several forms. In the face of ongoing calls for democratic reforms, early democratic elections to a national assembly were held in the 1950s. This was dissolved and transformed to a system based on local councils in the early 1960s, which was overturned in 1990 in favor of a parliamentary system. Government oppression of democratic activists throughout this period had led to widespread leftist activist movements used to operating underground and in opposition to the state, and in the early 1990s these movements began to fragment as the tensions between visions for Nepal became sharper. The transformation to a parliamentary system with open political parties put a sharp point on divisions, and in 1990 a number of leftist parties were formed with differing orientations to questions of democratic versus communist forms of government and differing attitudes about working with the Nepali monarchy. Communist activists formed the United People’s Front of Nepal (UPFN) in 1990 and won the third-largest number of seats in the Nepali parliament in the 1991 elections. Within the UPFN and the larger communist movement there was significant disagreement over strategies, and in particular the question of whether their movement should focus on violent or nonviolent approaches. This schism was formalized by the creation of the breakaway Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) in 1994, which was committed to the use of armed violence as a tool for overthrow of the government. What would grow into a long-running civil war began in 1996, when the CPN-M launched the first attacks.

As a Maoist organization, the CPN-M was organized around a commitment to communist government structures but also a framing of conflict as arising from competition between classes. As such, CPN-M focused on issues within Nepali society including economic inequality, poor treatment of workers, and poor provision of social services by the Nepali government. They were also associated with some trade unions, and labor issues became entwined with the development of the conflict.

The armed conflict waxed and waned from 1996 to 2001, when a short-lived peace agreement was signed. Throughout the conflict the government was able to retain control in the cities, while the CPN-M had more support in the countryside. A series of peace agreements and discussions were signed and then failed throughout the early 2000s, until the Nepali king Gyanendra asserted complete control over the government in 2005. His attempt to reassert complete monarchical rule was intended to centralize government authority in the face of the rebellion, but it triggered large-scale pro-democracy movements that eventually led to three-way discussions between the king, the Nepali pro-democracy Seven-Party

People read newspapers reporting on Nepalese government and Maoist rebels signing peace agreement in Kathmandu, 22 November 2006. Photo: Devendra M Singh/AFP via Getty Images
Movement, and the CPN-M. These talks resulted in the formal end to the conflict with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2006.

Private Sector Actors Involved

The National Business Initiative (NBI), an umbrella body initially composed of 14 Nepalese business associations and individual companies, eventually grew to a membership of 52 entities representing a large swath of the Nepalese economy.

Peacebuilding Activity

The roots of the NBI are in a 2003 conference on “The Role of the Private Sector in Peace Building, Reconciliation and Development,” aimed at sensitizing the business community in Nepal to its potential contribution to the peace process. At that point in the conflict the war had been going on for more than half a decade, and several failed cease-fires had created the belief that the combatants were willing to discuss what an end to the war might look like. The conference followed the participation of some Nepalese business leaders in an early 2003 conference sponsored by the Swiss Development Corporation on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, which spurred their thinking about the potential role of private sector leaders in peace. With support from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ, one of the German development organizations folded in 2011 into the current Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) and engagement by International Alert, three major business associations in Nepal—the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Nepal Chamber of Commerce, and the Hotel Association of Nepal—hosted the conference. About 150 attendees, including Nepalese business leaders and others, discussed how the private sector had participated in peace processes in other cases with particular focus on South Africa, and what this suggested for the role of the Nepalese private sector. Following this discussion, one point that was proposed was the development of a platform that would allow coordinated collective action. This idea was developed into the National Business Initiative, founded in 2005 on the principle that “There can be no successful business without successful society and there can be no successful society without successful business.” The original members of the NBI were 14 business associations and companies representing different sectors of the Nepalese economy, but by 2019 membership had grown to 18 business associations and 34 individual companies.

The NBI focused on shaping the behavior of its members and the private sector in Nepal broadly, as well as political engagement supporting peace through both public advocacy and elite diplomacy. These areas of focus were identified through a strategic discussion that identified both the root causes and drivers of the conflict, including poverty and economic inequality, and a discussion about what the private sector can do to address peace. The result of those discussions was a strategy that emphasized a process of internal standards development paired with a broader engagement strategy aimed at promoting effective partnerships with government and civil society for supporting peace. In the first case, the NBI believed that the private sector in and of itself could make decisions that could reduce root causes of conflict such as exclusion, inequality, and poor development.

The NBI believed that the private sector in and of itself could make decisions that could reduce root causes of conflict such as exclusion, inequality, and poor development.

As the security challenges in Nepal evolved away from major political violence to lower level but more sustained criminal challenges, the private sector’s role shifted to focusing more on workplace issues. Because the conflict had a strong economic element, with the Maoist rebels explicitly focused on issues of labor, economic activity was politicized and labor frequently used limited strikes or general strikes (or bandhs, meaning “closed”) as a political tool. The NBI recognized that their participants were affected by this and could in turn interact with these concerns. The NBI developed a code of conduct for responsible business practice aimed at reducing corruption and unequal treatment. After the launch of the code of conduct in 2013, the NBI began hosting occasional (held in 2014, 2017, and 2019) Responsible Business Summits designed to promote and support the effective behavior of the private sector.
In addition, the NBI promoted direct engagement in issues of peace through collective action and targeted mediation and support. The NBI reached out to civil society to participate in greater advocacy for peace as part of a movement to speak on behalf of the Nepali society as a whole. The NBI's strategy was rooted in the belief that the business sector by itself wouldn’t have enough of an effect on the larger political system in Nepal. Instead, by participating in a coalition with civil society and other groups, they could advocate on behalf of peace from the perspective of the private sector as part of Nepali society. In parallel with this, NBI participants (including particularly Chambers of Commerce) used their perceived impartiality as businesses interested primarily in economic activity to support mediation between competing political and potentially violent actors.

The NBI was part of a multisector commitment to supporting peace in Nepal. Tensions remained high for several years after the end of the conflict, but to date there has been no outbreak of armed conflict since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord. The specific causal link between the NBI’s work and this stability is hard to determine, but the NBI does represent a large-scale attempt at direct engagement with the underlying issues and root causes of conflict.

Why Businesses Were Involved

The history and public statements of the NBI suggest participants were driven by both concerns about private sector opportunities in Nepal and larger concerns about Nepalese society. The core principles developed by the NBI refer almost equally to issues affecting the profitability and economic activity of the private sector in Nepal and larger concerns about social development, quality of life, and well-being in Nepal. Similarly, formal publications by the NBI such as the code of conduct or their guidelines on business and security tend to emphasize both the economic impact of insecurity and corruption and also big-picture issues of the overall benefit to Nepalese society. As such, private sector actors involved appear to be interested in peace and stability both for their own sake as well as for the economic benefit they entail.

For More information


LUIS CARLOS VILLEGAS, COLOMBIA, 1999–2002

One-Sentence Summary

Business leader Luis Carlos Villegas, the president of the National Association of Industries, participated in two rounds of peace negotiations between the government and Colombia’s largest guerrilla rebel group, in an effort to bring to an end the Colombian armed conflict.

Conflict Context

Formed following a power-sharing agreement between left-wing and right-wing political parties that many felt marginalized rural populations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC) was founded in 1964 as the militant arm of the Colombian Communist Party. In its early stage, the organization mainly operated in rural areas. In addition to defending rural communities from government attacks, FARC provided educational and medical services to the locals, trained militants for combat with help from the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and carried out small-scale attacks on the military.

However, beginning in the 1970s, faced with diminishing international support and later the dissolved Soviet Union, FARC became increasingly violent and turned to illicit sources for funding, including production and distribution of illegal drugs, kidnap and ransom, illegal mining, and so on. As these activities were partially in response to the Colombian government’s counterinsurgency policy and attacks on communist groups and rural populations, their primary kidnap-for-ransom targets were politicians and elites.

This newfound wealth in cocaine trafficking and kidnappings expedited FARC’s fast growth in the 1980s. Benefiting from its provision of social services and escaping from a life of poverty, an unprecedented number of young people joined the group. FARC’s activities significantly distorted the country’s economy and undermined its development. At the national level, a large portion of the government budget went to military expenditures, which could have been more productively allocated to promote development. It is estimated that, without the conflict, Colombian annual GDP had the potential to grow 2–4 percent higher than it did. Collateral damage, including destruction of infrastructure and the illicit drug trade, were also economically costly.

The first formal attempt to reach a peaceful agreement was started in 1982, by President Belisario Betancur. In 1984, the final agreement—the Uribe Accords—was signed by FARC and the Colombian government, reaching a bilateral cease-fire that provided means for FARC member fighters to reintegrate into society. More importantly, Patriotic Union (UP), a political party co-founded by FARC and the Colombian Communist Party, was formed in 1985 as part of the Uribe Accords to represent leftist voices in formal politics. The party achieved huge political success in 1986 elections but swiftly destabilized and dissolved due to systematic assassinations and forced disappearances of UP members and leaders. The Colombian army, joined by right-wing paramilitaries and drug gangs, murdered and disappeared thousands of UP members, with estimates as high as 6,500 in total from 1986 to 1992, including UP presidential candidates. The official cease-fire, as one would expect, was broken.

There were multiple formal and informal attempts at peace negotiations afterwards. In 1999, FARC’s growth reached 18,000 members and 3,000 cases of kidnapping, which provoked the “No Más” anti-FARC protests by the Colombian population and unmanageable violence in the country. Popular pressure induced the restart of the peace process. Unfortunately, no agreement was reached, and President Pastrana ended the peace talks in 2002.

With over 220,000 people killed and over five million people displaced, the Colombian conflict became the last remaining guerrilla conflict in the Western Hemisphere. On the bright side, the number of active fighters dropped from an estimated
high of 20,000 to as low as 7,000 when President Santos took office. FARC’s power was evidently declining, as was its endurance to continue fighting. In 2012, what’s now known as the Santos Peace Process started. As FARC leaders insist themselves, they desired peace from the very beginning, but the conditions were not established before.

After rounds of negotiations, in November 2016, this 52-year-old internal conflict finally came to an end. A painstakingly negotiated peace accord between the Santos government and FARC was approved by the Colombian Congress. This historic cease-fire deal enabled FARC to transition from a violent rebel group to a legitimate political party ahead of the 2018 elections. In addition, its former fighters are able to live legally with the help of special education programs.

Challenges remain after the demobilization process, but it is important to recognize Colombia’s success in the historic peace processes, an important positive step toward a stabilized economy.

Private Sector Actors Involved

Luis Carlos Villegas is a respected Colombian business leader. He was invited by President Andrés Pastrana to join the government negotiation team of the 1999–2002 peace talks. Later under President Juan Manuel Santos, Villegas was again brought onboard, as one of the chief negotiators.

Villegas, though he took on the role as a representative for the private sector, is no outsider to foreign affairs or politics. His career included positions as the personal secretary of the development minister; economic advisor at the Colombian embassy in France; governor of his home province Risaralda; governor and secretary-general of the National Coffee Federation (Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia, or Fedecafe); and vice minister for foreign relations. In the private sector he held roles as president of Eastern Financial Corporation (Corfioccidente), a financial services company of which Fedecafe was a main stockholder, and president of the National Association of Industrialists (Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia, or ANDI), a position that defined his career where he served for almost two decades, until 2012.

ANDI is a nonprofit organization that promotes the “political, economic, and social principles of free enterprise.” Founded in 1944, ANDI has since been the most important business association in Colombia, now with more than 1,200 members that represent half of the national GDP. As the president of ANDI, combined with previous relationships he established with both conservative and liberal sides of politics, Villegas could be an effective representative of Colombian businesses at the peace negotiation table.

Peacebuilding Activity

When the Pastrana peace process started in 1999, Villegas was invited by the then president to go on a government commission. He went on a European tour accompanying core FARC members to facilitate their exploration of political
support from Europe. The tour itself was controversial, with people from both public and private sectors disagreeing with the decision. But Villegas, having an unprecedented amount of time spent closely with core FARC members, had the opportunity to observe and understand their pursuit and personalities, and even to establish personal connections with the group’s leadership. This experience granted him a unique advantage at the negotiation table, which undeniably increased his persuasiveness.

However, after business actors participated in the early negotiations of Pastrana’s renewed peace process, they were sidelined and restricted from key negotiations and provision of technical information. Having had much less influence than expected, this limited participation eventually led to dissatisfaction among the businesspeople involved.

This disappointment led to the decrease in business leaders’ support for Pastrana as well as distrust in the peaceful negotiation approach. As his peace talks broke down in 2002, unsatisfied enthusiasm on the part of business leaders transformed into endorsement of presidential candidate Álvaro Uribe. He promised during his campaign to crack down on FARC with a tough military approach. Peacebuilding efforts paused as Uribe took office, but his strong-hand approach did result in a weakened FARC in both military and economic terms. This change in comparative power between the government and FARC paved the way for the success of future peaceful negotiations.

In the next round of negotiations under President Santos, Villegas was invited to represent private sector interests again, as one of the chief negotiators. A year later, as the then Colombian ambassador to the United States made an emergency exit due to allegations against him, Santos appointed Villegas to Washington, DC, trusting his diplomatic skills to take on this political heavyweight. In this way, Villegas ended his 17-year career as president of ANDI as well as his participation as a negotiator in the peace talks.

However, Villegas’s contribution to the Colombian peace process didn’t end there. As the new Colombian ambassador in Washington, he secured US support from the Obama administration for the peace talks. The US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement came into effect in 2012, which strengthened the Santos government’s negotiating leverage as well as the country’s economy. Similarly, the United States has been in close collaboration with the Colombian government in peacebuilding, mostly through a program called Plan Colombia. While in Washington, Villegas managed to secure more US support by consolidating follow-up strategies of this program. As a result, the US government appropriated a total exceeding $9 billion from 2000 to 2014 that contributed significantly to the final success of Santos’s peace process and the stabilized situation in Colombia.

Later, in 2015, Villegas left the ambassador post in Washington to return to Colombia, taking on the post of defense minister. As he said after participating as defense minister in negotiations to create a transitional justice system, “Today after Havana we have a clear and robust system of justice that guarantees no impunity, to be applied to both the guerrillas and the government agents and other agents who participated in the conflict, which guarantees justice and legal certainty for the future.”

**Why Businesses Were Involved**

Colombian businesses appreciate the value of peace because they understand the cost of conflict. The long-standing internal conflict has prohibited the effective and efficient utilization of domestic capital. Companies on average put 5 percent of budget aside for safety and protection, not to mention the cost of interrupted transportation or production due to ruined infrastructure. The conflict has also created an unfavorable risk rating that drives away foreign partners and investors. Taking into
consideration the internal conflict, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s gave Colombia BB-level ratings, which is too low to be attractive to foreign direct investment, thus restraining available financing for business development.

Security matters to business overall. It is widely believed that Colombian GDP would have grown by several additional percentage points annually had the conflict ended. Having experienced and viewed the conflict as a liability affecting the competitiveness of their businesses, Colombian business leaders started to actively seek solutions and invest in peace. In other words, because the costs of conflict had risen to an unbearable and unsustainable level, it was in businesses’ own interests to participate in peacebuilding. Furthermore, since the election of President Pastrana, it became fashionable for businesses to participate in peacebuilding activities, and business leaders did so with genuine willingness and enthusiasm. Therefore, as president of ANDI, the most important business association, Villegas shouldered the interests of the private sector to participate in the peace processes.

Villegas’s active engagement was invited by the government and welcomed by FARC. On the one hand, President Pastrana and President Santos both wanted to secure the support of the private sector elite by inviting Villegas on board as a negotiator. On the other hand, FARC recognized the importance of business leaders including Villegas as part of the negotiation team, considering them experts with a solid understanding of FARC’s economic concerns.

In addition to private and public sector considerations, personal motivations may have also contributed to Villegas’s participation in peacebuilding. One possible motivation lies in his interest in politics. Before entering the private sector, the posts he held gained him sufficient exposure and connections in the public sector and among high-level officials. His personal interest in politics is evident through his career trajectory. With a record of contributing to peace negotiations in the most impactful internal conflict in Colombia, his importance and prominence in politics are sure to grow, as exemplified through his appointments as ambassador to the United States and minister of defense in the years that followed.

Another potential personal motivation has to do with his family. After completing the controversial government-commissioned European tour with FARC members, an incident involved Villegas personally as a victim of FARC. While studying political science at Universidad Javeriana, Villegas’s alma mater, Villegas’s daughter Juliana was kidnapped by FARC. The guerrillas voluntarily released her after three months and kept her unharmed. Some credit this unharmed release to his previous personal engagement with the group, while others consider this encounter FARC’s attempt to test Villegas’s ties with right-wing paramilitary organizations. Either way, this incident is sure to be unforgettable for Villegas and had an inevitable impact on his thoughts regarding engagement with FARC through formal channels.

For More information


ENRICO BIGNAMI, NESTLÉ ALIMENTANA, NIGERIA, 1969

One-Sentence Summary

Vice president of Nestlé Alimentana Enrico Bignami acted in the role of special representative of the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to coordinate negotiations between the Nigerian government and the ICRC around humanitarian aid delivery.

Conflict Context

During British colonial rule over the territory now governed as Nigeria, the British government created administrative structures without concern for the existing ethnic makeup of the region. When the region gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, this administrative structure was carried forward with the result that Nigeria was made up of multiple distinct ethnic groups with different cultural, religious, and governance traditions. The dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria, composing the majority of the population, were the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo, and the Yoruba. Although all three, as well as many other ethnicities, were spread across Nigeria, each was concentrated in a different geographic area. The southeast region of Nigeria, known as Biafra, was majority Igbo.

Early elections resulted in political dominance by the Nigerian north, and also featured ethnic mobilization and interethnic violence among some groups within Nigeria calling for more self-determination. Concerns about inequality and the perceived corruption of the government led to labor disputes and a nation-wide strike in the mid-1960s. This dissent culminated in a series of coups d'état and violent attacks in 1966, resulting eventually in the installation of the Igbo general of the Nigerian Army, Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, as head of state and then, after another coup and the death of Ironsi, Yakubu Gowon (an ethnic Angas).

This disruption, and in particular the belief that Igbo had been involved in coup planning with the intent of consolidating Igbo control of the government, led to massive violence against Igbo within Nigeria. Tens of thousands of Igbo were killed, and more than a million displaced with the majority of the refugees fleeing to the Biafra region. The governor of the Biafra region, formally the military governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, negotiated with the central government for more autonomy and a looser federal structure for Nigeria. Ultimately the central government moved to strip the Igbo-dominated regions of most of the territory containing oil reserves, a major revenue source for the region. In response, in May of 1967 the governor of the region, Odumegwu Ojukwu, declared the independence of the region under the name the Republic of Biafra.

The Nigerian government responded with a blockade of the region and, in July of 1967, a military invasion of the region that led to ongoing fighting. By 1968 the continued blockade and the ongoing fighting had led to severe malnutrition in the area, and the government of Nigeria openly acknowledged the intentional use of starvation as a weapon in their conflict. Increasing global awareness of the scale of the conflict led to the development of an ongoing humanitarian response through airlifted supplies. Multiple religious

Nigerian refugee in Nigeria-Biafra war zone. Photo: Public Health Image Library
organizations and humanitarian aid organizations provided supplies, and the operation as a whole was coordinated by the International Committee of the Red Cross. This response was controversial, as most international governments formally supported the Nigerian government and did not recognize the Biafran state. Moreover, the Nigerian government claimed that the airlift was not limited to humanitarian aid and assistance but was cover for weapons smuggling to Biafrans. In 1969 the Nigerian military shot down an ICRC flight, leading to the suspension of aid and a dispute between the Nigerian government and the ICRC about who would govern the airlift response.

The Nigerian military was successful in prosecuting the war, with international support, and by late 1969 was in a dominant position. The official end of the war took place in January 1970, when the Biafran forces formally surrendered.

Private Sector Actors Involved

The key private sector actor was an individual, Enrico Bignami, who was vice president of Nestlé Alimentana but acting in the negotiations as the special representative of the president of the ICRC.

Peacebuilding Activity

Nestlé’s operations in Nigeria began in 1961, and by the outbreak of the Biafran war it was well established in the country despite import restrictions imposed by the Nigerian military government in the late 1960s. Enrico Bignami, during his work at Nestlé Alimentana, had been responsible for establishing operations in Apapa and Nguru near Lagos. He also, due to his position at the Swiss-based headquarters, engaged with the commercial and political elite in Switzerland, including the ICRC. Nestlé had worked with the ICRC in both world wars and had a history of loaning staff to the ICRC to act as country representatives. During the Biafra conflict, Nestlé provided funding in support of the ICRC’s humanitarian work.

In the late 1960s, the ICRC had begun to experiment with bringing in non-ICRC staff, particularly Swiss citizens with experience in business and politics, to address technical and staffing gaps in ICRC work. This strategy was specifically deployed in the Biafran conflict, where in 1968 the ICRC sought to change tensions between the Nigerian government and the ICRC by requesting that the Swiss government allow a Swiss diplomat, Auguste Lindt, to operate as the ICRC commissioner-general for the Biafra region. Separately, the ICRC lobbied Swiss companies directly and through the Swiss Department of Economic Affairs to encourage companies to loan staff to the ICRC in support of their work, and by 1969 most of the major heads overseeing the ICRC’s work in the conflict were Swiss citizens not previously affiliated with the ICRC. This strategy had a checkered impact, generating both internal pushback and resistance and also continued political confrontations between the Nigerian government and ICRC representatives.

ICRC’s role in the Biafran conflict had primarily involved the provision of humanitarian aid, but providing this aid required negotiations with both Nigerian and Biafran officials. The Nigerian government had blocked the Biafran region, and the Biafran representatives resented the political neutrality of the ICRC and wanted direct engagement with the distribution of aid. The politics of delivering the aid were complicated, with ongoing tensions with the Nigerian government, including the eventual 1969 shooting down of an ICRC airplane delivering assistance. In July of 1969, Enrico Bignami took over as special representative of the president of the ICRC to head the negotiations with the Nigerian and Biafran representatives. The primary focus of his work in Nigeria was on negotiating with the Nigerian government to reestablish humanitarian aid and to establish a pathway for handing over the coordination role the ICRC had been playing to the Nigerian National Rehabilitation Commission.
Humanitarian aid was reestablished, but any support that the ICRC provided to the idea of mediation or negotiation between the two parties was not successful. The war ended with a military victory by the Nigerian government rather than a negotiated settlement.

Why Businesses Were Involved

This appears primarily to be an individual decision motivated by humanitarian principles. Although Nestlé had a long-standing relationship with the ICRC, Bignami was operating primarily as a representative of the ICRC in his work in Nigeria. It’s also the case that Bignami retired from his position at Nestlé Alimentana in 1969, probably coinciding with his move to work with the ICRC.

For More information


PEACEWORKS, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE, 2002–PRESENT

One-Sentence Summary

PeaceWorks, a US gourmet food distributing company with a “not-only-for-profit” philosophy, initiated profitable joint ventures between Palestinian and Israeli businesses in a bid to increase economic cooperation and intergroup contact.

Conflict Context

Following the growth of the Zionist movement calling for the establishment of a Jewish state in the then British-governed Mandate of Palestine in the 20th century, and in particular after the world recognized the full scope of the Holocaust, the state of Israel was created following the UN plan to partition Palestine. On May 14, 1948, the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel marked the birth of Israel, and the British Mandate of Palestine was officially terminated at midnight on the 15th.

Hours later, several neighboring Arab states invaded and attacked the Jewish settlements. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the Holy Land was divided into three areas. The state of Israel was bordered by The Gaza Strip and the West Bank (of the Jordan River, including East Jerusalem) occupied by Egypt and Jordan, respectively. Successive wars followed in the region, which deepened the conflict between Israel and Arab states but with minor shifts of territory.

Then in 1967 during the Six-Day War, the Israeli military capture the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), and the Golan Heights. Later, in 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack, the Yom Kippur War, aiming to take back the lost land, with no success but huge casualties. The Camp David Accords in 1979, mediated by US President Jimmy Carter, provided certain reconciliations between Israel and Egypt and calmed the regional conflict.

Peace treaty signed and regional territorial disputes settled, a surge in uprisings among the Palestinians followed. Lasting from December 1987 until 1991, the first intifada was a Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. In 1993, the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s government and Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Front established relations between the two. A framework and the Palestinian National Authority was also created for Palestinian self-governance. Nevertheless, the agreement was seen as a betrayal by extremists on both sides, which resulted in escalated protests and violence. Then Ariel Sharon’s visit to the holy site referred to as the Haram el-Sharif or the Temple Mount to different communities, led to the second intifada from 2000 to 2005, which caused even greater casualties among both the military and civilians than the first.

In 2015, following waves of violence and conflict, Palestine withdrew from the Oslo Accords, and no major peace agreement has been reached since. Despite continuing actions toward stabilizing the conflict, the struggles between Israelis and Palestinians that began in the early 20th century remain to this day.

Private Sector Actors Involved

PeaceWorks Holdings, LLC, started in 1994 by social entrepreneur Daniel Lubetzky, has been a “not-only-for-profit” business that pursues both profit and peace. Its flagship brand, named Meditalia, is a series of healthful food products imported from Israel and made through cooperative engagement between providers standing on opposing sides of the political conflict.
PeaceWorks was founded after Lubetzky received a Haas Koshland Fellowship to foster joint ventures among Arabs and Israelis. In the wake of the failure at the 2000 Camp David Summit and escalated violence between Israelis and Palestinians, Lubetzky used financial resources from PeaceWorks to co-found the OneVoice Movement under PeaceWorks Foundation in the Spring of 2002.

**Peacebuilding Activity**

In 1994, Daniel Lubetzky developed PeaceWorks after having the idea to import an Israeli sun-dried tomato spread to the United States. He learned that the local producer was facing significant challenges because of local violence. His employees, primarily Palestinian, weren’t able to regularly make it to the factory because of violence and travel restrictions.

Seeing the business opportunity and potential for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, Lubetzky suggested marketing the product in the United States, highlighting the Israeli manufacturer’s relations with his Palestinian partners. The original product label featured two cartoon characters, Moshe and Ali, an Israeli and an Arab, over the slogan “Cooperation never tasted so good!” The intent of the project was to promote local economic development and use the cross-cultural cooperation as a marketing tool. The business was extremely successful, and in 2002 Lubetzky co-founded PeaceWorks Foundation and the OneVoice Movement to promote peaceful dialogue and practical steps to a two-state solution to the conflict.

The PeaceWorks business model is explicitly built on its link to local peacebuilding: it uses its connection to peacebuilding as a marketing and promotion tool, and in turn uses 5 percent of the profits of the company to fund peacebuilding work through its foundation and the OneVoice Movement.

The specific impact of PeaceWorks is difficult to assess, in the context of a conflict that has significant historical roots and geopolitical elements. However, PeaceWorks consciously works to establish cross-conflict and transnational supply lines with the intent of increasing economic interdependence. To take one example, a tapenade marketed by PeaceWorks uses olives grown in Palestine, glass jars from Egypt, and sun-dried tomatoes from Turkey, and the final sun-dried tomato paste is made in Israel. This model is intended to spread the economic benefit across multiple groups and create economic interdependence, elements known to contribute to peace. PeaceWorks also consciously attempts to connect Israelis and Palestinians with each other in a context that can reduce intergroup conflict.

**Why Businesses Were Involved**

From a private sector standpoint, putting aside social considerations, PeaceWorks represents a new, lucrative business model, and it has proven profitable for the founder. Within a decade of PeaceWork’s establishment, the company reached
$1 million in revenue with profit margins as high as 10 percent. The peace component behind the production became the most heart-touching and effective method of brand marketing. Part of PeaceWorks’ snack business is now detached under the company Kind, LLC. Since then, Kind has become the fastest growing snack company. In addition, political beliefs may also have played a part in this peacebuilding activity. PeaceWorks, its foundation, and OneVoice all promote the two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, surveys show Palestinian support for the two-state solution is weakening. As recently as 2017, more than 60 percent of Palestinians did not trust peaceful coexistence with Israelis. The growth of right-wing Israeli politics has coincided with a similar decline in Israel. In contrast, the United States and Western society mostly believe the two-state solution to be the appropriate approach. So does Lubetzky. In this way, the political beliefs of the company and its founder may also be behind their effort to achieve peace.

Finally, Lubetzky’s own personal passion toward peace for the region is also an undeniable factor. Born to a Jewish family with firsthand memory of the Holocaust, it is not hard to understand his interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He studied abroad in Israel in college, and his undergraduate thesis was 268 pages on “The Influence of Economic Factors in Resolving the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” Awarded the Haas Koshland Fellowship after receiving his law degree, he did an in-depth field research project titled “Incentives for Peace and Profits: Federal Legislation to Encourage U.S. Enterprises to Invest in Arab-Israeli Joint Ventures.” Collectively, this suggests that as an individual he has a long-standing interest in and connection to the region and the conflict.

For More information


FEDERACIÓN NACIONAL DE CAFETEROS, 2011–2015, COLOMBIA

One-Sentence Summary

The Colombian Coffee Growers’ Federation designed and executed a multidimensional training and economic development program focused on supporting peace in partnership with international NGOs and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation.

Conflict Context

Colombia faced a long-running conflict between the government, supported by armed right-wing paramilitary groups, and left-wing organizations including FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), and the M-19. This political conflict between right-wing and left-wing groups went on between 1946 and 1960 and ended with the establishment of the National Front as a unified government with power-sharing mechanisms. Some leftist movements opposed the National Front, particularly those organized or operating in the country, where they felt that the political elite ignored or marginalized rural communities. Starting in the mid-1960s, armed groups organized around leftist movements, and in particular populist leftist movements based in the countryside began to coalesce, with all of the major armed groups formed between 1964 and 1973. At first the operations of these groups were relatively limited, but their operations triggered violence against left-wing leaders and human rights defenders, including violence against union organizers. An increasing cycle of armament and violence on both sides took place from the 1970s through the 1990s, when the violence peaked. A series of negotiations and peace agreements with different groups took place in the 1990s, with only the FARC and ELN continuing to operate in the 2000s as major groups.

A peace process based in Havana from 2012 to 2016 led to the eventual signing of a major peace agreement between the government and FARC, and as of June 2017, FARC officially disarmed. The peace remains fragile, and the ELN has as of this writing never formally disarmed, but the breadth of the conflict in Colombia has decreased significantly since its peak.

The violence had a strong connection to agricultural and rural life: the origins of the leftist movements in anti-elite organizing and rural self-defense organizations meant that many supporters of the violent non-state groups were drawn from rural areas. Separately, the violent groups relied heavily on illicit activities, including drug cultivation, for funding. These elements meant that rural workers, particularly farmers and agricultural workers, were often exposed or connected to the violence as competing groups put pressure on them to fund their activities or attacked them due to connections with other groups.

Private Sector Actors Involved

The Colombian Coffee Growers’ Federation (Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia, FNC) is a collective association of Colombian farmers and coffee growers. The FNC is funded by the Colombian government and operates as a bridge between the government and Colombian coffee farmers.

Peacebuilding Activity

The Colombian conflict had strong elements of economic grievance relating to inequality and marginalization, and the conflict intersected with many coffee farmers either because of pressure to move to illicit crops as a way to generate more money or because of the presence of violent actors soliciting support. Because of this, the FNC had been involved
in issues relating to the conflict for much of the life of the war. Due to the engagement of coffee farms as a theater for conflict, the FNC formally developed approaches to peacebuilding and reconciliation that positioned it as a peacebuilding actor. Throughout the early 2000s, it worked with a number of different organizations to develop its approach to peace.

One major partner was the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation, which began funding FNC approaches in 2001. Through this partnership, the FNC also worked closely with the Spanish NGO Humanismo y Democracia. The three organizations set out to develop a large-scale, integrated program that would support peacebuilding in Colombia and jointly conceived of the Footprints for Peace program (Huellas de Paz), a coordinated multidimensional peacebuilding project.

The program was built around a combination of material support, training, and collective discussion across three pillars. The economic pillar focused on developing farmers’ performance through business skill development training and direct assistance. The program provided training on sustainable agriculture, best practices for coffee cultivation, business management skills, and food security and agriculture training more broadly. It also provided seeds and equipment to farmers who completed the training. The environment pillar focused on water and sanitation issues through a combination of training and equipment designed to protect local watersheds. The social pillar, which the program identified as its primary goal, was designed to address local attitudes related to peace and peacebuilding through multiple interventions. The program used a train-the-trainers approach, starting with a set of FNC members, to promote community-based dispute resolution and mediation skills. The trainings also promoted social narratives and attitudes associated with peacebuilding, including gender integration.

The final assessment of the program identified 20,004 people in 23 municipalities impacted by the Footprints for Peace program. Research by Jason Miklian and Juan Pablo Medina Bickel, including interviews with participants in the program, suggests that the program did result in improved community-level engagement and may have been a cause of reductions in local violence.

Why Businesses Were Involved

At the level of the FNC as an entity, the organization had been involved with peacebuilding work for some time. The conflict activity was a threat to its membership both in terms of their economy and as a persistent threat to their lives. As a result, the FNC as a bridge organization between Colombian coffee growers and the government appeared to see addressing the conflict as a natural and necessary part of its mission.

For More information


VIRUNGA ALLIANCE, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, 2011–PRESENT

One-Sentence Summary

The Virunga Alliance is a conservation-focused, peacebuilding public-private partnership that emphasizes sustainable development of natural resources of the Virunga National Park, mostly through clean energy, ecotourism, and sustainable agriculture with the goal of promoting economic peacebuilding in eastern DR Congo.

Conflict Context

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a low-income country located in Central Africa. It’s also known as DR Congo, Congo-Kinshasa (with the name of the capital city), and Zaire (historical official name). The country is the second largest by area and fourth most populous country in Africa. The DR Congo has huge natural resources potential and mineral wealth. Unfortunately, this endowment served as a curse, resulting in ongoing military conflict to this day.

In the 1870s, King Leopold II of Belgium sponsored exploration of the Congo Basin and acquired rights to the territory. Naming it the Congo Free State, Leopold made the land his private property and forced the locals to produce rubber, which caused millions of deaths due to disease and exploitation. In 1908, reluctantly under international pressure, Belgium annexed the land as a formal colony, named Belgian Congo. With growing nationalist movements, in June 1960, the colony gained independence, and Patrice Lumumba, a nationalist leader of communism and leftist ideology, became the first prime minister. Soon after, frictions within the leadership and intervention from Belgium and the United States resulted in the removal and execution of Lumumba, while putting Joseph Mobutu in power by financing his military coup. Mobutu’s opposition to communism made him a perfect ally for the United States during the Cold War, which earned him staunch support. Unscrupulously, his government was guilty of severe corruption and political repression, which hindered development. At the time of independence, DR Congo was one of the most industrialized African countries with productive mining and agriculture sectors supporting the economy, but the economy has declined drastically since the mid-1980s.

In 1998, the Second Congo War broke out. A rebellion, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, fought an armed uprising against government forces eventually backed by Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. This long-lasting conflict killed millions, and even after the 2002 peace deal and 2003 creation of a transitional government small-scale violence continued. The March 23 Movement (M23) was one of the most powerful armed actors in the postwar period. Allegedly supported by Rwanda, M23 was made up primarily of ethnic Tutsis against the Congolese government. A peace deal was achieved in 2009, but UN forces supported the Congolese military in fighting against M23, which led to its defeat in 2013. The instability in the region was largely due to poor governance, weak institutions, and rampant corruption, none of which was addressed by the end of the formal conflict and which continued to lead to ongoing violence.

Private Sector Actors Involved

The Virunga Alliance is a conservation-focused, peacebuilding public-private partnership. This collaboration was established in 2011 and brought together over a hundred local institutions from private, civil, and government sectors. The partnership focuses on sustainable and responsible development of the resources of Virunga National Park, a UNESCO World Heritage Site located in eastern DR Congo bordering Uganda and Rwanda. Founded in 1925, Africa’s oldest national park encompasses 7,800 km² of lakes, forests, and volcanoes, with communities of four million living within a day’s walk, making it one of the most stupendously biodiverse and densely populated rural areas in Africa.
Prince Emmanuel de Merode, the director of the Virunga National Park, dedicated his life to Virunga conservation and especially protection of the mountain gorillas, the last few hundred on earth of which reside in the park. However, a spate of killings in 2007 led him to reexamine the situation. After militia fighters killed a whole family of gorillas to clear the way for charcoal production in their habitat, Merode came to the realization that conservation of the park goes beyond wildlife protection, and instead needed to address issues of local conflict and economic development.

In this way, the Virunga Alliance was born. To overcome the problem and effectively address the drivers of local violence, the alliance was designed to bring on more resources and expertise than the park management team could access by itself. By carrying out sustainable development of natural resources of the Virunga National Park, mostly through clean energy, ecotourism, and sustainable agriculture, the institution seeks to bring peace and prosperity to local communities in eastern Congo.

**Peacebuilding Activity**

Poor management of natural resources in the region was one important contributor to cycles of violence. Charcoal and animals worth millions of dollars are illegally extracted and trafficked from Virunga by armed militias, and the profit is used to fuel more conflict in the region. The Virunga Alliance, well aware of the natural wealth the park represents, seeks to support peace and stability through better management of the natural resources. Profits from the park are in turn invested in projects benefiting the local communities.

There are thousands of armed groups operating nearby that seek to gain control over a portion of the natural resources like fishing. According to park estimates, over $100 million per year is generated in illegal revenue that supports armed conflicts. These activities include illegal charcoal production worth $34 million per year; illegal fishing on Lake Edward of an estimated 12,000 tons of fish per year; and poaching wildlife, including mountain gorillas, hippos, elephants, and lions, for bushmeat and other animal products.

It was not long ago that Virunga began to transition from a hideout and a resource bank for illegal activities to a stabilizing factor for the war-affected area. Emmanuel de Merode broke an agreement between rebel leader Laurent Nkunda and the Congolese government, which enabled government soldiers to redeploy in previously rebel-occupied territory and spared the southern part of Virunga from the civil war for the consideration of mountain gorilla protection. Using environmental and conservation imperatives to negotiate between conflict groups has become a recurring theme in Emmanuel’s approach, and Virunga has since played an increasingly stabilizing role in one of Africa’s most violent and lawless regions.

As a measure for protection, the park has a ranger program that hires people to fight against armed militias to ensure the safety of the animals and security of the park. The program has important peace implications. Over 160 rangers have died since the war started in 1996, mostly to protect the local people within or nearby the park. There’s undoubtedly exceptional pride among the rangers, and no one has ever left the force. Under their watch, the mountain gorilla population recovered beautifully, quadrupling since 1985. Additionally, armed militias in the region are having a much harder time invading the park and trafficking park resources because of the rangers.

It is true that there is pride in the uniform, and a strong sense of community. But at the end of the day, local communities need other measures that can improve their living standards to achieve better human development. In addition, a healthy
local economy requires attracting investment and capital flows. Thus, there is a commitment by the Virunga Alliance to improve the local infrastructure and governance.

To fully utilize the natural resources bestowed by the park, a development solution was designed with three pillars: ecotourism, clean energy, and sustainable agriculture. The ecotourism program was launched in 2014, and since that time more than 17,000 tourists have visited the park. The clean energy program, in the form of a major hydropower project, was intended to address deforestation driven by charcoal hunting, provide employment opportunities for the region, and potentially supply millions of people nearby with reliable and affordable electricity. Sustainable agriculture provided another approach for people to reengage in the formal economy through small and medium-size enterprises and micro-businesses. For instance, the Sicovir soap factory that the Alliance invested in now employs over 400 individuals.

Electrification and tourism programs this large required outside assistance, and the park was quite effective in terms of raising both awareness and funds. As of 2017, the park has a budget of $9 million for all park-related activities, and most of its funding comes from the Buffet Foundation and the European Union. With income from the park and outside funding, the Virunga Alliance was able to build 20 hospitals, 9 schools, and 2 health clinics. It also successfully rehabilitated 68 kilometers of roads. Moreover, 21 local villages now have access to public lighting from clean energy, and a network of over 5,000 hoes are powered by the hydroelectric projects.

**Why Businesses Were Involved**

An individual actor matters significantly in this case, and personal enthusiasm played an important role. Emmanuel de Merode’s parents belong to two of Belgium’s earliest and most powerful families, the House of Merode and the House of Ligne. Shying away from his European royal heritage, De Merode arrived in DR Congo in 1993 and earned his PhD in
anthropology by studying the Congolese illegal bushmeat trade. In 2008, he was hired as the director of Virunga National Park by the Congolese government. De Merode survived an ambush in 2014, currently not attributed to any specific group. De Merode still lives in Rumangabo, the park’s headquarters, in a tent alongside fellow park rangers. It is by now evident that, instead of personal fame or profit, De Merode’s interests lie in the peace and preservation of the national park region.

On the other hand, even though De Merode himself let go of valuable titles and prime living standards to make his contribution in DR Congo, not all his peacebuilding partners did. One major criticism of the electrification program lies in control of resources. Natural resources are the single most valuable possession one could have in the region. In DR Congo’s colonial past, foreign powers conquered the land and fought over the resources, and this is all too familiar to the local population—people are extra sensitive about others’ intentions when it comes to the natural resources. Whether some business participants in the preservation, electrification, or tourism programs were building closed circuits and claiming the land for themselves is yet to be seen, but it is certain that those programs should have a better trickle-down economic model to benefit the local communities.

Sufficient international support also plays an important role in peacebuilding efforts. Preservation of the park fits well into the UN’s Sustainable Development Agenda in numerous ways that enable the peacebuilding components to secure more attention and funding from the international community. Furthermore, due to personal ties with European high-level officials and elites across different sectors, De Merode is able to publicize the program to a huge variety of audiences and secure support from the European Union. There are many national parks that need protection on the African continent and even more internal conflicts that need assistance to end.

For More information


TURKISH CYPRIOt CHAMBER OF COMMERCe AND THE CYPRUS CHAMBER OF COMMERCe AND INDUSTRY, CYPRUS, 2002–2013

One-Sentence Summary

The Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry initiated a series of coordinated work on cross-Cyprus unification issues, which facilitated the official peacebuilding process through economic integration and humanized contacts between the two sides.

Conflict Context

Cyprus was settled by Greeks as early as the second millennium BC. Due to its strategic geopolitical importance between Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, the island was subsequently occupied by many major powers. Then in the 1570s, the island was conquered by the Ottoman Empire, leading to over three centuries of Turkish rule. By the late 19th century, about three-quarters of Cypriots were ethnically Greek, and a quarter were ethnically Turkish. The majority of Greek Cypriots are Greek Orthodox Christians, whereas most Turkish Cypriots identify as Sunni Muslims.

For much of its history, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived together harmoniously in a mixed society. However, under British rule since 1925, the two groups split up based on ethnicity, nationality, and religion, resulting in separate communities. When Cyprus gained independence from the British in 1960, the ongoing conflict between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots left the island functionally divided. The Greek Cypriots wished for union with Greece, while the Turkish Cypriots favored the annexation of the whole island to Turkey. For most of the mid-20th century, the two ethnic communities experienced a period of Cypriot intercommunal violence. Consequently, the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) were formed in 1964.

In 1974, Greece’s military junta along with Greek Cypriot nationalists conducted a coup d’état of the new Cyprus government to obtain more influence over the island. In response, five days later Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied the northern one-third of the territory. The result is an ongoing split on the island. While the Greek Cypriot government is the officially recognized government of the island, in practice their authority only extends to the southern part of the island while the Turkish Cypriots govern the northern half. Currently Turkey is the only country that recognizes the northern Cyprus declaration of independence.

Thanks to its strategic location, foreign presence and influence are strong in Cyprus, traditionally from Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the United Nations, and more recently from Russia and Israel. The most recent major effort to solve the Cyprus dispute was mediated by then UN secretary-general Kofi Annan in 2004. The plan was put to a referendum in both Northern Cyprus and the Cypriot Republic. The Turkish government was happy with the plan, and 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots voted yes, while 74 percent of Greek Cypriots voted against it, claiming that the Annan plan disproportionately favored the Turkish side. As a result, in total, the UN-mediated agreement was rejected by two-thirds of the voters, which was unexpected as both sides had claimed their preference for unification beforehand. This outcome most likely happened because halfway through the referendum, in May 2004, Cyprus joined the European Union, which strongly disincentivized the south from unification, as they have achieved the potential economic benefits they would have obtained from the plan. As a part of the UN agreement, UN forces agreed to control a buffer zone or “Green Line” separating the two Cypriot regions.
Most of the international society, including the EU and the UN, recognizes the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus over the entire island of Cyprus. In effect, they remain two separate populations governed by different administrations.

**Private Sector Actors Involved**

Representing the two sides of the conflict, there are two major private sector actors in this case: the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI) and the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO). CCCI is an umbrella business association for the Greek Cypriot community, representing a large number of individual businesses but also the majority of the professional associations as well as several municipal chambers of commerce. KTTO is a public organization in the Turkish regions of Cyprus, and membership is required for businesses. Because it was founded before the partition, it is recognized as a legal organization in the south of Cyprus, a role that gives it particular ability to operate in support of cross-border engagement.

**Peacebuilding Activity**

CCCI and KTTO worked hand in hand and established the Brussels Business Group (BBG), made up of Greek and Turkish Cypriot business leaders, who used their influence to informally bolster cooperation between the two sides and encourage goodwill settlements through joint statements to political leaders as well as public media. These actions resulted in a pulling force between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The BBG emphasized the economic benefits for the island as a whole if reconciliation and peace were attained, while also identifying confidence-boosting methods to encourage cooperation between the two business communities.

The majority of the projects and activities of the BBG focused on proposals that could be executed without concerning political leaders, because participants of the group were eager to emphasize that businesses are capable of engaging peacefully outside of political grounds. However, effective execution of proposals (including the restoration of religious monuments and establishment of stronger communications between the communities) was somewhat limited. Some sources have pointed out that only a handful of religious monuments were restored and only several international phone lines (with no extra charge for calling across the two communities) were built.

After 2002, official discussions involving Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities were revitalized, mediated by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Selected BBG participants continued to engage in the peacebuilding process, but BBG as a group dissolved due to reduced need for informal peace initiatives. CCCI and KTTO continued to promote the economic benefits of a closer bi-communal business relationship and continued to cooperate to this end.

KTTO was established in 1958, before the partition beginning in 1974. This factor has given it a uniquely helpful position by means of being legally recognized by both sides, enabling it to act as the major trade-talk facilitator. In 2003, KTTO facilitated the formation of Green Line trade regulations, as KTTO can act as the official body to determine product origin, while no other institution can. Similarly, in 2006, Cyprus Producers’ Network was created. It is a matchmaking website for businesses that want to cooperate across the divide. Unfortunately, promotion of both projects was low key as it was socially and politically controversial to work with the other side.

By 2009, people’s mentality had changed, possibly partially due to the ongoing business cooperation and the growing-up of the younger generation. That year, the Economic Interdependence Project (EIP) was launched, again by KTTO and CCCI with support from the UN. As their joint statement mentioned, the project seeks to encourage businesses from the two communities to “establish and improve business links between them” as they believe that business cooperation will “prove a win-win situation for both communities.” Like the BBG agenda, the EIP also aims to achieve its goals by having both communities doing business together. Unlike the BBG, the EIP project is better implemented with more fruitful achievements.
For instance, the EIP conducted research of existing interdependence with recommendations to policymakers for potential areas of improvement, and also issued joint statements on the benefits of reunification. The EIP produced mock news reports in a reunified Cyprus, through cartoons and other media. This change of agenda compared to BBG, though both were led by private sector actors, suggests a shift from strictly business participation to involving civil society in the peacebuilding process. Moreover, the EIP arranged business-to-business meetings, published a business directory of companies that wish to develop business relations across sides, and even launched partnership awards. Compared to the BBG, this approach allows opportunities for more private sector actors, instead of simply the business elites, to participate across the divide. The EIP ended in 2013, and its positive outcomes are evident. Greater bilateral cooperation was achieved, and economic interdependence across the divide was higher.

**Why Businesses Were Involved**

It is likely that a major driver was a self-interested focus on economic activity: the failure of many of the confidence-building measures suggests that there was relatively less interest in noncommercial projects compared to projects related to cross-community economic activity.

One distinct feature of the Cyprus disputes, as compared to most other major territorial conflicts, is that physical fighting has subsided. The political relations between the two groups remain delicately balanced, but people, especially the younger generation, want a reunification plan and consider the division a “stubborn older generation problem.” When political differences have been sidelined and people care more about economic development, the participation in peacebuilding by private sector actors, as economic experts and guides to future integration, is more likely to be effective and beneficial.

**For More information**


GROUP OF 7, NORTHERN IRELAND, 1996–1998

One-Sentence Summary

A coalition of industry associations and other groups representing business and economic interests in Northern Ireland engaged in a sustained push for peace based on the economic benefits of peace.

Conflict Context

Following the end of the Irish War of Independence with the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, the island of Ireland formalized an existing split between southern and Northern Ireland with the creation of an independent Irish Free State (now the Republic of Ireland) in the south and a UK-governed territory in the north. Within Northern Ireland, sectarian tensions between Irish nationalists desiring alignment with the Irish state and unionists who wanted to maintain the status quo led to long-running dissent. This was exacerbated by policies around voting and representation that led to nationalists’ feeling excluded from formal representation and access to economic benefits such as valuable employment. In the 1960s, tensions increased following further engagement with the Republic of Ireland and rising concerns about discrimination. Opposing marches in 1968 and 1969 ended violently, with both sectarian violence and police violence. The British Army was deployed to suppress riots, which in turn triggered an escalating series of violent attacks by non-state actors on both sides. Nationalist groups, most notably the Provisional Irish Republican Army, relied on international funding and arms smuggling to support their activities while unionist groups including the Ulster Volunteer Force and Ulster Defence Association likewise armed themselves. Both sides committed attacks against civilian forces, and throughout the 1970s and 1980s the conflict was characterized by civil unrest and terrorist attacks carried out by both sides.

By the mid-1990s, political engagement between the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland had established pathways for discussion between the combatant groups. A brief cease-fire was established as a result of negotiations in 1994, but it collapsed in 1996. From 1996 to 1998 ongoing diplomatic engagement led to the eventual establishment of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, establishing a framework for cross-border cooperation and power-sharing in Northern Ireland.

Private Sector Actors Involved

The Group of 7 was a coalition of business associations including the Northern Ireland Confederation of British Industry, the Hospitality Association for Northern Ireland, the Institute of Directors, the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Northern Ireland Growth Challenge, the Northern Ireland Economic Council, and the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions.
Peacebuilding Activity

The ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland took a significant toll on the community in terms of both violence and lost opportunities for economic development. By 1990, the violence had been grinding on for more than 20 years, and there was increasing interest in peace in principle as well as in developing diplomatic opportunities for negotiation. In 1994 the Northern Ireland Confederation of Business Industry, a political group organized to promote the private sector, commissioned and released a short paper titled “Peace: A Challenging New Era” that laid out the argument that the conflict had operated as a significant disruptor of the economy of Northern Ireland and that peace would pay a significant “peace dividend” to the economy by reducing the need for the government and private companies to divert funds to security and freeing those funds for other uses.

The Group of 7 was formed two years after the publication of the initial paper by the Confederation of British Industry and seven other major Northern Irish industry associations. These included the Hospitality Association for Northern Ireland, representing hotels and hospitality companies; the Institute of Directors, a membership organization of business leaders; the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a membership organization representing private sector businesses; the Northern Ireland Growth Challenge, an initiative focused on promoting economic growth in Northern Ireland; the Northern Ireland Economic Council, an advisory council of the Northern Ireland government focused on economic issues; and the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, representing the major trade unions in Northern Ireland. Collectively this group represented the major coalitions of economic and business interests in Ireland, including both major businesses and business leaders as well as trade unions. Because of the breadth of their membership, they were authoritatively positioned to speak on behalf of the economic interests of Northern Ireland in the abstract and the collective.

The goal of the Group of 7 was to promote the ongoing peace negotiations, and eventually to promote the effective implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. To achieve this, the Group of 7 presented itself primarily as an apolitical voice for peace emphasizing the economic benefits of peace and the costs of conflict. Its primary role was advocacy around this point, creating both public media messages and private messages delivered to political elites about the economic opportunities of peace. It also worked with other organizations to develop and promote inclusive approaches to business operations intended to reduce sectarian tensions. While the group appears to have largely avoided mediation, it did host neutral meetings between all parties involved in the peace process in which it emphasized the economic benefits of peace and offered the meetings as neutral spaces for discussion. Specific individuals associated with the Group of 7, Sir George Quigly of the Institute of Directors and Chris Gibson of the Confederation of British Industry, were involved in a 1998 negotiation around a potential flashpoint issue pitting Catholic residents of a neighborhood against Protestant orders intending to march. The two representatives met with both sides in order to develop a shared resolution to the standoff.

Although the full implementation of the peace agreement was inconsistent and remains a source of contention in Northern Ireland, violence dropped significantly after the Good Friday Agreement, and in 2005 the IRA formally renounced violence in favor of nonviolent advocacy.

Why Businesses Were Involved

The framing of business engagement in this issue was built around the economic benefits that peace would bring, and these benefits were clearly identifiable and well-developed in the publications and messages from the group. At the same time, members of the Group of 7 presented this emphasis as a conscious strategic choice designed to emphasize their neutrality on the political questions and their interest in peace. Given this, and given the fact that the Group of 7 was made up of Northern Irish industries and Northern Irish business leaders who had all been exposed to the conflict in some way, it’s not possible to rule out an interest in peace for personal or humanitarian reasons even if the group’s formal messaging was built around economic interests.
For More information


CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN INDUSTRY, INDIA, 2001–2002

One-Sentence Summary

At a period of extremely high tensions between India and Pakistan, concerns about a loss of international corporate investment led the Confederation of Indian Industry to lobby the Indian government to avoid increasing tensions.

Conflict Context

India and Pakistan were ruled as a united territory under British colonial rule, but ethnic tensions between the Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim communities led to a 1947 plan to partition the territory into Hindu- and Muslim-majority countries. The announcement of the planned partition immediately heightened existing ethnic tensions, leading to widespread communal violence and large numbers of displaced people. Both communal violence and cross-border migration continued after the formal establishment of India and what was then East Pakistan and West Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Disagreements over control of disputed territory, particularly Kashmir and Bangladesh, led to four major wars between India and Pakistan between 1947 and 1999 and long-running border skirmishes including cross-border artillery fire and insurgent attacks.

In 2001, militants attacked the Indian Parliament House. Five attackers were able to clear the initial security checks using falsified identities, and once inside the security perimeter attacked the building with guns, grenades, and explosives. The attack did not succeed in killing any members of Parliament, but it did kill nine people as well as the five attackers. Indian intelligence agencies identified the attackers as being associated with Pakistan-based militant organizations Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, and there was widespread belief within India as well as claims from some in government that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency was involved in planning or directing the attack. In response to the attack, the Indian government mobilized the military and began to position them near the Indian-Pakistani border and the Line of Control in Kashmir. Pakistan responded with a reciprocal military buildup, and global concerns of an active war in the region began to grow.

Private Sector Actors Involved

The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) is a collective association of businesses representing Indian industry to the government. In particular, the CII worked to represent the voice of the Indian technology industry and its connections with international funding.

Peacebuilding Activity

In 2002, India’s economy was significantly globalized: India’s pool of educated and English-speaking citizens, coupled with the gap between local wages and European wages, had led to a significant boom in outsourced offices from major transnational corporations. This integration had fueled an Indian economic boom and provided India with significant foreign reserves.

As the risk of war escalated in 2001 and 2002, both local Indian industry and international corporations became increasingly alarmed at the potential for open armed conflict. The economic and human cost of such a conflict would be significant, and it would likely result in significant operational disruption to those companies (whether international or domestic) that had operations based in India.
In mid-May, an attack on an Indian Army camp led to a significant increase in tensions including the expulsion of the Pakistani high commissioner. On May 31, 2002, the United States issued a travel advisory against travel to India and advised US citizens in India to leave. This advisory immediately impacted tourist income to India and triggered a reconsideration by some international companies about whether to maintain operations in India. These companies reached out to local Indian offices and affiliates, who in turn worked with the Confederation of Indian Industry and with national politicians to underscore the economic threat that perceived risk of war posed. The Indian government had prioritized economic development as a tool for developing India, and as a part of this had created an expectation of India as a stable and open country. The CII emphasized both the need for this perception to continue in order to encourage foreign investment, and the massively disruptive risk a reduction in foreign investment posed for the development goals of the government.

The CII’s engagement in early June coincided with heavy diplomatic engagement from global leaders including Russian, American, British, French, and Japanese leaders all promoting peaceful solutions. Specific causality is not easily determined, but some aspect of the combination of governmental and private sector diplomacy appears to have been successful: although cross-border military strikes continued throughout the summer, there was no large-scale offensive or major war.

Why Businesses Were Involved

All indications suggest that the primary concern of the private sector actors was economic: the triggering event identified for specific outreach was the reconsideration by multiple companies with operations in India about whether to move their operations or investment to other sources.

For More information


BUSINESS LEADERS FOR NEW PRIORITIES/BUSINESS LEADERS FOR SENSIBLE PRIORITIES, UNITED STATES, 1996–2008

One-Sentence Summary

A coalition of business leaders, eventually expanded to political actors and others, advocated for a reduction in US military spending through public advertising campaigns.

Conflict Context

The Cold War period in the United States was marked by a significant expansion of military spending and military operations compared to historical numbers. The US government saw the threat of communism as potentially an existential threat and from shortly after the end of World War II developed a strategy of global containment that obliged the it to provide military support and engagement with anticommunist regimes across the world. In addition, the global nuclear arms race spurred a significant expansion of military funding as the United States supported extensive research and development in the belief that it needed to maintain an advantage in terms of the number of nuclear weapons.

By the 1980s, ongoing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the continuing nuclear arms race and the long history in both countries of military engagements had led to a situation where both countries were spending large amounts of their GDP on the military and defense. The Reagan administration continued a significant buildup of the military that had begun in the Carter administration, leading to the largest peacetime expansion of the military in US history from 1983 to 1986. In the mid-1980s the United States and the USSR began a series of diplomatic talks focused initially on limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, leading to a significant reduction in tensions and the eventual reduction of nuclear stockpiles.

In the late 1980s, economic and political reforms within the Soviet Union intersected with nationalist and democratic movements in many parts of the USSR. Through a series of revolutions and elections, a number of Soviet states broke away from the USSR, and in 1991 the USSR was officially dissolved. In the midst of this internal upheaval, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and US President George H. W. Bush met at the Malta Summit and officially declared an end to the Cold War.

The US government responded to these developments in part by reducing defense spending. From fiscal years 1991 to 1996, US defense spending declined both in real terms and as a percent of GDP. By the mid-1990s, Republican figures in Congress were concerned about the trend and in 1995 added additional funding to the budget for fiscal year 1996 above what the Clinton administration had requested, beginning a debate on military spending that would continue during the remainder of the administration.

Private Sector Actors Involved

The group of corporate CEOs included Ben Cohen from Ben & Jerry’s, Bruce Klatsky of Phillips–Van Heusen Corporation, Alan Klingerman of AkPharma Enzyme Marketing, and Ted Williams of Bell Industries as well as others.
Peacebuilding Activity

In the proposed budget for defense spending for fiscal year 1997, the Clinton administration originally called for a cut to defense spending. This proposal was sharply criticized by congressional Republicans, who felt that it represented an unacceptable decline in investing in US national security.

In the context of this debate, a coalition of CEOs and heads of business, organized by Ben & Jerry’s founder Ben Cohen, formed the group Business Leaders for New Priorities to advocate for a reduction in military spending and a greater emphasis on social spending. In June of 1996 they launched an ad campaign including a full-page ad in the *New York Times*, a press conference featuring several heads of companies making their case, interviews with the press, and the launch of a new flavor of ice cream named Totally Nuts. Their ad quoted President Eisenhower’s 1953 speech on tensions with the Soviet Union, in which he said that “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.” The group’s core argument was that US national security interests no longer justified the military spending the United States was currently undertaking, and that there was no need to expand the military budget in the way some had proposed.

Their analysis of the budget was that it represented institutional inertia, with Cold War spending being carried forward without justification. They explicitly argued that US military spending was an economic drag to the US economy, making the United States less competitive than international partners with much lower military spending. They also argued that there was significant need for social spending in the United States, from education to infrastructure, at a time when income inequality was beginning to significantly increase.

The initial engagement wasn’t successful in changing the government’s plans, and the 1997 budget increased US defense spending by roughly $8 billion. Following this, Ben Cohen founded a formal nonprofit under the name Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities, intended to carry on the same basic approach of public advocacy intended to reduce the military budget. From 1997 to 2008 this group, which eventually included more than 700 business leaders as well as high-visibility actors, retired military leaders, and others, funded ad campaigns and lobbied to reduce the military budget. It targeted both public awareness-raising issues and specific political races, particularly the New Hampshire and Iowa primary elections. In 2008 it was brought into the Center for American Progress, and eventually ceased operations.

The specific impact of the group is difficult to disentangle from other political pressures on the US budget. US defense spending remained relatively flat in real terms through the late 1990s, although it continued to decline as a share of the US GDP. Following the September 11th attacks, military spending showed a significant increase in both real and percent-GDP terms, but the relative impact of public campaigns compared to other pressures is hard to identify.

Why Businesses Were Involved

Key leaders of the organization, particularly Theodore Williams of Bell Industries and Ben Cohen of Ben & Jerry’s, made clear that their motivation was primarily a question of where they thought the US priorities should be on the basis of principles. Although economic competitiveness was an argument used to support their calls for cuts to the budget, particularly in the first iteration of the Business Leaders group, the principal actors tended to explain their engagement on the basis of principle rather than economic interest.
For More information


FRITS PHILIPS, PHILIPS COMPANY, THE NETHERLANDS, 1941–1943

One-Sentence Summary

Frits Philips, head of the Philips Company, deliberately hired Jewish workers and attempted to protect them from the Holocaust by using his work with the Nazi government to keep them from deportation.

Conflict Context

During World War II, the German strategy called for an invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands as part of its goal of extending German control over Europe, and specifically with the goal of fortifying these countries to prevent Allied invasion while allowing the Luftwaffe a base of operations against Great Britain.

The German invasion of the Netherlands began on May 10, 1940, and on May 15 the Dutch government surrendered. The German occupation of the Netherlands included the “Nazification” of Dutch institutions and the extension of German policies to the Netherlands, including the registration and later deportation of Jews living in the Netherlands. The initial deportation of Dutch Jews in February of 1941 triggered a brief nationwide strike, but this was quickly put down. Despite the work of the Dutch resistance to both hide Jewish people and attack the Nazi occupation, by the end of the war more than 100,000 of the estimated 140,000 Jews living in the Netherlands had been killed.

In September 1944, the Allied advance from the Normandy invasion reached the Netherlands, but did not succeed in capturing all the bridges across the major rivers in one operation and only the southern part of the Netherlands was liberated, including Eindhoven. The occupation of the rest of the Netherlands continued from September 1944 to the formal surrender of German forces in the Netherlands in May 1945.

Private Sector Actors Involved

Frederik (Frits) Philips was the president of Philips Electronics, a major Dutch electronics factory with its headquarters in Eindhoven.

Peacebuilding Activity

Although Philips was the president of the company, he was required to report to a director appointed by the Nazi government as part of their policy of German oversight of major Dutch institutions. This director expected the Philips Company to produce war materiel, a position that gave the company a strategically valuable position within the German occupying forces.

Frits was concerned about the growing prosecution of Dutch Jews and planned to use the company to protect Jewish employees and Dutch Jews more broadly. In late 1941, after the February deportation that marked the beginning of a formal policy of removal, Frits created two new divisions within the company specifically for Jewish employees. These divisions were located in Eindhoven and Hilversum and initially were composed of 103 employees.

As the German campaign against Dutch Jews grew throughout 1941 and 1942, Frits was able to use the strategic necessity of the company’s work to protect his employees from orders to concentrate Jews in Amsterdam.
As the German campaign against Dutch Jews grew throughout 1941 and 1942, Frits was able to use the strategic necessity of the company’s work to protect his employees from orders to concentrate Jews in Amsterdam. He also instituted a policy of food distribution, providing meals to his employees at a time when food insecurity was a challenge in the Netherlands. Throughout 1942 he attempted to use the resources of the Philips Company to obtain exit visas for Jewish workers but ultimately failed. In 1943 the German occupation government worked with the Philips Company to establish a work site in the Vught concentration camp. Frits succeeded in negotiating for the ability to provide food to workers as part of the establishment of the production line, and the workers in the production line were briefly (although not ultimately) protected from deportation.

Frits was arrested in 1943 by the German government for suspicion of involvement or support for a nationwide strike including workers at the Philips factories, and after he was released in late 1943, he was excluded from any role or influence within the Philips Company. He eventually went underground after being informed that he was to be arrested again and remained underground until the liberation of Eindhoven in 1944.

Why Businesses Were Involved

Frits’s motivation appears to have been purely humanitarian: there was no economic advantage to his work protecting Dutch Jews, and in fact it may have contributed to threats to him as a person and to the performance of his company under the occupied Dutch regime. Frits was open about his disagreement with anti-Semitism even early in the occupation, and he appears to have taken the opportunity his position afforded to act to protect vulnerable civilians.

For More information


COCA-COLA, INDIA/PAKISTAN, 2013

One-Sentence Summary
Coca-Cola set up linked video machines in India and Pakistan that encouraged individual citizens from each country to engage in joint games or activities designed to promote interpersonal connection and intergroup contact with the goal of reducing prejudice.

Conflict Context
India and Pakistan were ruled as a united territory under British colonial rule, but ethnic tensions between the Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim communities led to a 1947 plan to partition the country into Hindu- and Muslim-majority countries. The announcement of the planned partition immediately heightened existing ethnic tensions, leading to widespread communal violence and large numbers of displaced people. Both communal violence and cross-border migration continued after the formal establishment of India and what was then East Pakistan and West Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Disagreements over the control of disputed territory, particularly Kashmir and Bangladesh, led to four major wars between India and Pakistan between 1947 and 1999 and long-running border skirmishes including cross-border artillery fire and insurgent attacks.

In 2012 and 2013, relations between India and Pakistan had been souring after a brief period of improvements in the early 2010s, which in turn followed major diplomatic disengagement after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the perpetrators of which originated in Pakistan. A 2012 Pew Research poll found that in both India and Pakistan, a strong majority of people saw the other country as a significant threat to their own. In both countries, however, a strong majority felt that it was important to improve cross-border engagement and increase trade.

Private Sector Actors Involved
Coca-Cola was the primary business actor, in partnership with ad agency Leo Burnett.

Peacebuilding Activity
Coca-Cola has emphasized the ideas of interpersonal connection, sharing, and shared humanity as part of its brand image since the 1971 airing of the famous ad featuring an international cast singing “I’d Like to Buy the World a Coke.” In 2011, Coca-Cola began developing the idea of “Small World Machines,” focusing on promoting person-to-person connectivity by linking people in areas of tension with each other. The goal of the project was to promote a sense of interpersonal connection by giving people the chance to see each other and engage in shared activities together. Working with their advertising agency, Leo Burnett, the company developed the scope of what these machines might look like. Leo Burnett approached creative firm The SuperGroup to develop the technology that would allow people to interact at a distance and built this technology into Coca-Cola dispensing machines.
In 2012, Coca-Cola approached their offices in India and Pakistan with the idea of rolling these Small World Machines out in the two countries, responding to the persistent gap in and lack of formal connections between the two countries. These offices worked together with the Leo Burnett team to identify the locations and eventually to set up the machines in malls in Lahore, Pakistan, and New Delhi, India.

There were both technical and political challenges to the project, including an unspecified security threat that required suspending the project shortly before it was launched. However, in March 2013 the machines were installed in MGF Mall in New Delhi and in the Mall of Lahore in Lahore, Pakistan. When installed, the machines encouraged passersby to approach a life-sized screen showing the video feed from the other machine. When two people were facing the separate machines, the screen would encourage them both to put their hands together and engage in a joint activity. These ranged from tracing images of circles or peace signs to invitations to dance together. After these tasks, the machines would dispense cans of Coke to share.

The machines were in place for a relatively short time, with little information available about exactly how long that was, except in terms of cans of Coke dispensed—the machines dispensed more than 10,000 cans throughout their installation.

Participants reported that they felt a sense of connection with the people on the other side of the screen, and commented on things such as the feeling of shared humanity that came from jointly touching hands or even simpler things such as surprise at seeing how similar the dress was between the two countries. The interactions were filmed and released as part of a web-based video showing the impact of the Small World Machines. Larger-scale impact on the relations between Pakistan and India, if any, is harder to identify, and indeed tensions between the two countries showed no significant reductions following the campaign.

Why Businesses Were Involved

Although the project staff at Coca-Cola were explicit in their goal that the Small World Machines increase connections between India and Pakistan in the service of promoting interconnections between the countries, the primary business motivation appears to be promoting the Coca-Cola brand both within the region and internationally. Coca-Cola has presented itself as a brand focused on shared humanity and unity, and the Small World Machines were explicitly intended as an advertising campaign and executed through Coca-Cola’s advertising team. The video compiled from the machines has, as of 2019, more than three million views on YouTube.

For More information


ENDNOTES


8 UN General Assembly, “The 2030 Agenda.”


11 UN and World Bank, *Pathways for Peace*, xxvi.


28 Guaqueta, “Occidental Petroleum, Cerrejon, and NGO Partnerships in Colombia.”
29 Miklian, “Mapping Business-Peace Interactions.”
One Earth Future (OEF) is a self-funded, private operating foundation seeking to create a more peaceful world through collaborative, data-driven initiatives. OEF focuses on enhancing maritime cooperation, creating sustainable jobs in fragile economies, and research which actively contributes to thought leadership on global issues. As an operating foundation, OEF provides strategic, financial, and administrative support allowing its programs to focus deeply on complex problems and to create constructive alternatives to violent conflict.

OEF RESEARCH

One Earth Future believes that policy and practice reflect the quality of available information. Its research department promotes empirically-informed research developed using methodologically rigorous approaches as a tool for policy making in peace, security, and good governance. OEF believes in analyzing evidence using both quantitative and qualitative best practices. We also believe the most innovative solutions to problems of conflict and peace necessarily involve a diverse set of disciplinary and sectoral viewpoints. Much of the research department’s work aims to break down the barriers between these different perspectives.

CONTACT US

303.533.1715  info@oneearthfuture.org  525 Zang St. Broomfield, CO 80021

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